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Chapter I: Conflicting Narratives
What was Black Power? What role did it play in the civil rights movement? The
burgeoning scholarship of Black Power Studies, coined in 2006 by Peniel Joseph,
continues to sort through the diverse factions, persons, and events that made up what has
been termed the Black Power Movement. These initial questions become yet harder to
answer when one considers the still settling dust of the Civil Rights Movement itself.
Matters of blame and credit have yet to be definitively attributed. The prevailing narrative
of the Civil Rights Movement takes place almost exclusively in the South, begins in 1954
with the Brown vs. Board of Education Supreme Court case that ruled separate but equal
schooling unconstitutional, and culminates heroically with the Civil Rights Act of 1964
following the previous year’s March on Washington. 1 Along with the 1965 Voting Rights
Act, these two pieces of legislation ended the legality of Jim Crow segregation in the
South in the major areas of public accommodations, education, and and
disenfranchisement for the South’s African American population. In fact, according to
President Lyndon Johnson in 1965, “the struggle has been all about the South.”2
This version of civil rights has an obvious hero in Martin Luther King, Jr and
obvious victories with King’s “I Have a Dream” speech on the steps of the Lincoln
Memorial in August 1963 and the aforementioned legislative victories over the next two
years.3 “Black Power” rhetoric and ideology, first championed by Stokely Carmichael in
1966 and then carried violently forward by such radical groups as the Black Panther
Party, stands as the tragic epilogue to this heroic narrative. 4 Buying into this aggressively
militant separatist movement, African Americans in northern cities rioted intermittently
throughout the latter half of the decade. 5
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Indeed, riots did explode all across the country during that period. According to
Nat Tillman, editor of the Louisville Defender newspaper, “1966 saw the emergence of a
“Black Power” slogan that caused a gulf between various civil rights factions and
precipitated an unrest among whites that culminated in a vast backlash.”6 Violence
occurred in cities across the country following his April 4, 1968 assassination in
Memphis. Louisville, Kentucky, though many there mourned the passing of the famous
civil rights activist, did not erupt in violence. Sam Hawkins and Robert Sims, prominent
Louisville activists and former SCLC (Southern Christian Leadership Conference)
members who had been arrested and acquitted during the open housing demonstrations
the previous autumn, released a statement warning that the then accepted policy of nonviolent protest might be abandoned.7
This narrative obscures as much as it reveals, and in fact “these histories are as
much the product of forgetting as remembering.”8 Stokely Carmichael, in defining the
term “Black Power” in Black Power: The Politics of Liberation, wrote that “it is a
growing sense of community. It is a growing realization that black Americans have a
common bond not only among themselves, but with their African brothers. 9 “It is
absolutely essential,” Carmichael continues, “that black people know [their] history, that
they know their roots, and that they develop an awareness of their cultural heritage.”10
The narrative of the latter half of the sixties, and especially the period 1967-1970,
is not one of tragedy. Nor does it denote the shift of the civil rights struggle from the
South to the North, or from nonviolent protest to militant Black Power. What this period
of civil rights saw, in Louisville and on the national scene, was the rise of the Black
Power movement within, and alongside, the nonviolent southern wave of activism that
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constitutes most common conceptions of the ‘civil rights movement’. Locally, WECC
(West End Community Coalition) and other activists embraced many facets of black
power ideology. This did not lead to the marginalization of prominent white activists
such as the Bradens as the organization they directed, the Southern Conference
Educational Fund (SCEF), endorsed black power and supported local black power
discourse, including militancy rhetorics. 11 The idea that Black Power promotes complete
separatism, or that it seeks to rid “the civil rights struggle of white people” is something
that “has been untrue from the beginning.”12
Charles Kaiser, in 1968 in America, wrote that “For a surprisingly large number
of Americans, I think 1968 marked the end of hope...Violence was everywhere...in
American streets two months later, when 65,000 troops were needed to quell riots in 130
cities after Martin Luther King Jr.’s killing. “Go home and get a gun” was Stokely
Carmichael’s advice”.13 While 1968 may indeed have been a violent and explosive year,
with war, civil unrest, and high-profile assassinations blanketing the national
consciousness, 1968 was neither the advent of the Black Power movement, nor
necessarily more violent because of the Black Power movement. In fact, according to
Robert Self in American Babylon, “in their conflation of black power, black nationalism,
black radicalism, and violent urban rebellions and riots, they leave us bereft of the
meaningful distinctions that provide a guide through a tangled and tumultuous period.”14
The civil rights movement in the late 1960’s, and the rise of Black Power in the
national consciousness, is not best characterized by the violence endemic of the period,
but by the shift of the focus of the movement from the federal to the local level. Black
Power’s self-determinism and community activism, along with a distrust of local
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government and frustration over what was seen by many as the obstruction of earlier civil
rights victories, came to establish a power relationship and purpose different than that in
the south in the early 1960’s.15
During this period, Louisville, Kentucky was immune neither to Black Power nor
to violence. Detailing the struggles of civil rights activists, both African Americans and
whites, in Louisville demonstrates men and women struggling for equality in their city
using a variety of means. As many civil rights groups and leaders embraced Black Power,
they used it to continue the struggles of the Long Civil Rights Movement. The issues they
fought for and their methods in doing so blur issues of Northern and Southern Civil
Rights, the role and causes of urban violence, and forces reconsideration of established
narratives of the movement as a whole. The situation in Louisville leading up to the riots
in May 1968, along with the events of the trial of the “Black Six”, serve to illustrate these
changing dynamics and the role of Black Power rhetoric in the reshaping of localized
subversive publics. These publics worked to define ideas of African American
community and equality against the prevailing narrative of civil rights tragedy and
fragmentation during these turbulent years.
Robert Self’s assertion then, that soft generalizations stand at the heart of
misconceptions of the black power movement, is as equally true during the civil rights
struggle in Louisville, Kentucky in the latter years of the 1960’s as it is in any other city
across the country. However, this form of misconception is more nefarious than mere
mistake. Blaming Black Power rhetoric for escalations in violence burdens the African
African community and civil rights advocates with responsibility for urban riots
regardless of the actions and policies of white city governments. In Louisville, as in
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Harlem in 1964 and other American cities, prevailing black power narratives worked
rhetorically just as governments worked judicially to absolve themselves of blame. . 16
Another primary facet of misunderstanding between white and black publics
involves the rhetorical use of the geographic location of Louisville itself. Louisville was,
and is, some combination of southern and northern city. Mark Ethridge, general manager
from 1936-1963 of the Louisville Courier-Journal and the Louisville Times, the two
major local papers, is known for stating flatly that “I believe the Negro gets a better
break in Louisville than in any southern city.”17 This southern white paternalism framed
the conception of civil rights progress in many cities across the south. Rather than
representing pockets of substantive social change, this attitude typically served to further
conservative and segregationist ends.18 This opinion, and identification, was long held by
conservative whites in Louisville, especially among the progression of city
administrations that sought to utilize such a rhetorical positioning to mollify the
increasingly frustrated African American community.
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Chapter II: Louisville’s Publics
“Black people must redefine themselves, and only they can do that. Throughout this
country, vast segments of the black communities are beginning to recognize the need to
assert their own definitions, to reclaim their history, their culture; to create their own
sense of community and togetherness.”- Kwame Ture and Charles V. Hamilton, Black
Power: The Politics of Liberation19

To understand the civil rights movement in Louisville, Kentucky, particularly the
movement in 1967-1970 as a time both of union and division, progress and defeat, one
must understand the various local civil rights publics that came to dominate the civil
rights discourse during this period. Rhetorical theory understands ‘publics’ to be
particularly oriented subject positions which individuals place themselves either in
relation to or as part of.20 According to to Jenny Rice in her work Distant Publics, “a
publics approach looks to common patterns of everyday talk in order to uncover the ways
people read themselves into these rhetorical acts...participants in these rhetorical scenes
used public discourse to orient themselves to the scene of public crisis.”21 For the
purposes of this study then, a public constitutes a group of individuals who have either
explicitly or implicitly agreed to join in a certain discourse in a certain way involving a
specific set of rhetorical tools.
The white administration of Louisville, before but especially following the
election of Mayor Schmied, constituted one such public. Their agreed subject position on
civil rights discourse was one of southern identification and comparison. Louisville’s
white press continued to cultivate an image of Louisville as progressive in their
6

responsiveness to African American needs, an image that many African Americans found
false.22 This was a subject position that historically, and especially as a player in the
southern “heroic period of civil rights” in 1954-1965 showed Louisville in a favorably
progressive light.23
This myth of progress continued as, during the 1950’s and 1960’s, conditions for
African Americans in Louisville worsened.24 The rhetoric of progress, however, allowed
white government officials to overlook outcries against institutional racism. Lyman
Johnson, a prominent Louisville civil rights activist, spoke to this when he said “the white
leaders would say, ‘Look how good we are to you. Now, don’t bug us too much.’”25
Stokely Carmichael in Black Power: The Politics of Liberation, wrote that “black
people must organize themselves without regard to that which is traditionally acceptable,
precisely because the traditional approaches have failed.”26 This conception of black
power, as an outgrowth of ‘heroic civil rights’ instead of a perversion of it, remains as an
important distinction in understanding the Louisville African American community’s
response to Louisville government’s rhetorical positioning. Throughout the struggle for
civil rights, Louisville activists would form, join, and reform a variety of rhetorical
publics, all with their own subjective positions and acceptable tools of public discourse.
Even the riot of May 1968 can be seen as a public utilizing a narrow set of rhetorical
tools.
However, far from being completely distinct entities, these publics worked to
constitute the rise of a self-conscious black public.27 The actions of these groups and
individuals, taken together as a black public, worked to create a discursive “counter
public sphere” in which the white public of city government and the white press could be
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effectively challenged.28 The primary public that worked to create this counter public
sphere was the black press. Louisville’s iteration of the black press was The Louisville
Defender newspaper, headed by Frank L. Stanley, Sr., who spoke to the role of the press
in an address to the national Insurance Association on July 24, 1968: “[The Negro Press]
was almost exclusively printing news of, by, and for the Negro…He believes what he
reads in the Negro press because he knows that it is meant for him The same can not be
said of what he reads in other media.”29
It is important then to identify The Louisville Defender as not just one of a
multitude of publics in which African Americans took part in advocating for civil rights.
Through a privileged position within the community, the public of The Louisville
Defender constituted a set of subject positions and rhetorical tools utilized to advocate
their favored positions and outcomes. The privileged position of The Louisville Defender
as a public allowed it a nearly unique, within the Louisville African American
community, ability to foster cooperation between other publics and to shape the subject
positions and rhetorical tools of those publics.
In a letter to Frank L. Stanley, Sr. from William O. Walker, Walker wrote that:
“In his search for status and identity, the Black man has had to rely
on the Negro press for a voice and a medium of expression…
The Negro is not being fooled by this selfish, superficial
motivation [by the white press]. He knows that when the hounds of
segregation bark and, the mailed fist of racism scourges over our cities and
nation, it is the Negro press that gives the leadership and furnished the
imputus [sic] for unity that enables the persecuted and segregated Blacks
to coalesce in their determination to survive and meet the challenge.
The Negro press will survive as long as Black people are an
identifiable segment of the American population.”30
This attitude of Louisville’s African American readers, turning to The Louisville
Defender for news about the African American community in Louisville, both works to
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demonstrate the public that Louisville’s black press represented and the contribution of
that public to the city’s black public. In this role, The Louisville Defender fostered black
cultural nationalism working to challenge the city’s white cultural hegemony.31 Another
way Frank L. Stanly and the Defender worked to shape a black public was to publish a
special edition feature documenting the “Negro’s Role in History”. 32 Frank L. Stanley,
Sr. spoke to the reasoning for an issue such as this when he stated that “unawareness of
where the Negro fits in the American society results in…many Negro youths have
become frustrated, discouraged and bitter over their feeling of nobodyness.”33 This
statement by Frank L. Stanley and its implicit need for such a self-awareness to be
fostered within the African American community, echoes Harold Cruse in The Crisis of
the Negro Intellectual: “The rules of the power game meant that unless the American
Negro taught himself the profound implications of his own revolutionary significance in
America, it would never be taught to him by anybody else.”34
This creation of ‘nobodyness’ caused by the creation of a sense of
placenessness and ahistoricism of African Americans, particularly the younger generation
of African Americans living in increasingly segregated urban neighborhoods, creates
alienation.35 Overcoming this alienation requires cultural nationalism that creates the
black public in which African Intellectuals “create [the] values by which his race is to
struggle, live, and die.”36 Through his role as the editor of The Louisville Defender, Frank
L. Stanley worked actively to create a black public to challenge this alienation and work
for civil rights justice. In doing this, he also challenged other prominent African
Americans in the community to “identify your company and yourself with the Negro
revolution…by becoming directly involved in our struggle for human dignity.”37
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This Louisville black public also contained many different civil rights groups that
worked to further shape Louisville’s civil rights movement. One major narrative of the
prevailing city’s public that these Louisville African Americans and white activists
challenged was an association not with southern states and their antagonistic role towards
southern civil rights movements, but with civil rights struggles in the north. Other
Louisvillians argued simply that the divide between Louisville and the deep south was
simply not as wide as the city’s government and white intelligentsia claimed. 38 CORE’s
successful use of sit-ins in Louisville and other northern cities, a tactic usually identified
with southern activists, as well as its prominent role in civil rights in the north and south
in the early 1960’s, blurs this ideological and methodological divide.39 The identification
of Louisville as either northern or southern held important rhetorical utility for both the
city leadership and Louisville activists.
In what Peniel Joseph termed the ‘heroic civil rights struggle’, racism was a facet
of southern society. That racism took the form of de jure segregation in public
accommodations, public schools, and voting. The period from 1954 to 1965 saw these
pillars of white supremacy dismantled, first by Brown v. Board of Ed that desegregated
schools, then by a massive wave of non-violent marches, sit-ins, and boycotts that
desegregated public accommodations, and finally by the Voting Rights Act of 1965 that
removed many barriers to African Americans being able to cast ballots in the south. This
is the narrative that prominent Louisville whites were tapping in to in considering
Louisville a progressive southern city. 40
Louisville, in regards to these mainstays of Jim Crow, had indeed been
progressive. Though segregation had taken place in the city, it had never been as strong
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as it was in the Deep South. Sit-ins and protests in Louisville proved very effective in
dismantling the city’s segregations in public accommodations. African Americans had
also rarely been kept from voting in the city. There were arrests and reported cases of
violence during June 19, 1961 demonstrations in support of open accommodations in the
city, with most violence originating with white ‘spectators’ throwing rocks and other
items at the demonstrators. During the course of open accommodations negotiations,
Louisville’s mayor still declared “that Louisville ‘has gone further in desegregation than
in any other city, including St. Louis’” and as he called on downtown businesses to
desegregate. The triumph of the heroic narrative seemed especially triumphant in relation
to Louisville.41
However, this narrative fails to take into effect other types of de facto segregation
not enforced by law that could be found in many cities in the south and in the north. In
Louisville, as in many places in the south, school desegregation severely lagged behind
the Supreme Court ruling striking down separation based on color. In this issue as well,
following the ‘wait and see’ approach of the Kentucky Board of Education, Louisville’s
activists pointed to progress in cities in other border states as an indictment of Kentucky’s
lack of speedy implementation.42
Another civil rights issue generally associated with the north was open housing
and the segregation of African Americans into racially homogeneous ‘neighborhoods’.
Struggles over open housing had existed in northern cities since at least the 1920’s, in
many cases with African Americans attempting to integrate white neighborhoods meeting
violent confrontation with white residents. 43 More recent cases in the 1950’s such as the
prominent case of the Braden’s had also met with violent white resistance. 44 In the South,
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under the guise of heroic civil rights narrative, these same issues were easier to ignore
with the other, more explicitly apparent tenets of Jim Crow struck down. Without those
other issues, “there was no dramatic or symbolic issue around which to mobilize the
community.”45 In the South after 1965, the struggle for civil rights was seen as won by
many that had supported the movement of the previous decade.46 In this sense, the
rhetorical struggle over the geographic location of the city impacted disagreement not just
over the rate of progress by the city’s leadership, but also which issues activists were
mobilizing to combat. The changing and disparate conceptions of Louisville’s place in
civil rights worked to shape the rhetorical tools and methods appropriated by the various
dominant and subversive local publics.
Many of these publics took the form of community action groups. In the early
1960’s, many prominent groups were local chapters of national organizations. CORE
(Congress of Racial Equality) founded a Louisville chapter in 1960 and remained an
influential factor in local activism until the middle of the decade. The NAACP, of which
Lyman Johnson served as a leader of the local branch, also played an active role in
Louisville during this period.47 In the latter half of the 1960’s, other, local groups took
center stage in Louisville civil rights.
Primary among those was WECC (West End Community Council), which was
organized to keep Louisville’s West End an integrated neighborhood, to “ward off an allblack neighborhood.”48 Founded on May 22, 1963, by Anne Braden, by 1967 WECC was
the major voice of Louisville civil rights, as well as the first Louisville civil rights
organization to take upon itself the label of Black Power. 49 Though this shift in ideology
initially caused Anne Braden and others to question whether they would be allowed to
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continue working in the organization, WECC continued to be an integrated entity with
white members in prominent leadership roles. Ruth Bryant describes the WECC
philosophy as “We tried to have a black and a white co-chairman. Yeah, the West End
Community Council was balck and white and largely people with college degrees.”50
WECC’s Black Power positioning assumed a character much closer to cultural and
political nationalism championed by Amiri Bakara and others than the more militant
rhetoric of the Oakland Black Panthers or even the self-defense arguments of Robert F.
Williams in Negroes with Guns.51 However, “they [WECC] would go as far as they had
to go, within limits, of course, to accomplish a goal.”52
As a member of WECC, Ruth Bryant served as chairman of the housing
committee. From this position, she worked closely Mansir Tydings, executive director of
the Louisville Human Relations Commission, another prominent Louisville organization,
on the issue of open housing. She also served on the Mayor’s Advisory Committee on
community development and the League of Women Voters. Ruth Bryant describes
herself and her rapidly expanding involvement thusly:
“I think I was, the thing I was what you would call palatable, you see. I
was articulate and I knew how to carry myself….Well, they thought that I
was a nice lady but they didn’t know, you know, there was an iceberg that
was going to be tipped, that would become volatile.”53
Ruth Bryant, though she used her role on the Mayor’s Advisory Committee to forward
information to the other committees, she quickly became disillusioned with the ability of,
or interest in, city hall doing anything to better conditions in the West End. 54
In the creation of a black public in Louisville, these individuals and groups
worked together to further civil rights causes. Individuals like Frank L. Stanley, Sr. in his
role of as editor of The Louisville Defender, the West End Community Council and those
13

associated with it, including Anna Braden, Ruth Bryant, and Ken Phillips, who was cochairman in the late 1960’s, the Louisville Human Rights Commission, and other groups
worked together in support of a variety of goals, employing different methodologies and
rhetorics, to advance Louisville civil rights. In doing so, they called in other activists,
such as Frank Stanley, Jr., Frank L. Stanley, Sr.’s son and a prominent activist, as well as
Whitney Young, an activist in New York with ties to Louisville. Others, such as Robert
Sims and Sam Hawkins, were “street activists” that rose to prominence through the
housing demonstrations of 1967 and other civil rights initiatives.55 This public formed
despite the discouragement of whites, who sought to avoid “people being involved and
aware and wanting to articulate demands.”56

The other important facet of publics is that their repertoire of rhetorical tools
changed in response to their interaction with other publics. In this sense, the disparate
Louisville civil rights publics reacted against each other, as well as outside forces,
reforming and shifting in relation to the demands of the moment. Militancy and
radicalism, when it became prominent in Louisville African American civil rights
discourse, grew out of both the obstructionism of the Louisville government, especially in
housing, and the changing national trends in civil rights rhetoric associated with the rise
of the Black Power Movement.
While “local Black Power advocates focused on empowerment, pride, and
community development”, Blaine Hudson, leader of the Black Student Union and other
younger activists adopted Black Power because of the “ineffectiveness of the old
strategies” and their “worn out tools.”57 C.H. Parrish, and African American Sociologist
and University of Louisville professor, while agreeing that activists under thirty tended to
14

be more militant, cited a poll by The Courier Journal that suggested African American
acceptance of all attributes of white power rhetoric, especially an aversion to the term
“Negro” as a method of identification, was overblown by white media listening to the
voices of a small number of militants. 58 Maurice F. Rabb, Louisville resident and member
of the national board of the NAACP however, recalled that “I was brought up in the
theory that the proper way to address me would be to say “Negro” but it’s popular now to
say “black,” it’s very popular to say “black” and not say “Negro.” As far as I’m
concerned it doesn’t make any difference.” 59 In these rhetorical positionings, one begins
to see a divide between Louisville’s African American middle class and its African
American working class or poor. While many middle class African Americans worked
diligently for civil rights in the city, in many cases their goals differed from the African
American poor living in the increasingly segregated West End. Frank Moorman, an
African American businessman, when asked about the demonstrations and picketing that
occurred during the struggle for desegregated public accommodations in Louisville in the
early 1960’s, stated that “no I didn’t [feel any urge to become involved], because I knew
that would be the wrong thing for a businessman. Therefore, I stayed out of all of that.”60
When asked again if he made any contributions to the demonstrations, Moorman initially
restated that “no. We didn’t participate at all” and then that “I may have made some
financial contributions. Small, you know, but that is about the only contribution that I
could afford to make being in business, you know.”61 The relationship between
Louisville’s civil rights movement and its African American middle class remained
varied and complex throughout the decade.
Other prominent Louisville African Americans also sought to make it understood
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that militant rhetoric was not pervasive through the African American and activist
communities. Lyman Johnson, in a Letter to the Editor of The Louisville Defender, wrote
that:
“It is certainly time for some Negroes to speak out and let the general
community know that every black who opens his mouth does not
necessarily speak for the totality of the non-white community…Certainly
we deplore the ghetto, poverty, the present war, racism, and the like. But
we also deplore violence, stupidity, and destruction as rational means of
strategy.”62
Even in decrying, and misrepresenting, role of Black Power in Louisville civil rights
publics, Lyman Johnson’s repudiation asserts the significance of Black Power ideology in
shaping the movement in Louisville in the late 1960’s. Also, in writing his statement as a
letter to the editor of The Louisville Defender, Johnson affirms the existence and
importance of a discursive black public sphere which allowed such rhetorical and
ideological divisions within the community as shifting facets of an ever-evolving black
public that constantly redefined itself.
Black power rhetoric certainly played a significant role in this evolution of the
rhetorical tools employed by these publics within the black public sphere. The dominant
narrative regarding the role of black power in civil rights, according to Peniel Joseph in
his introduction to Neighborhood Rebels is one in which black power created “a white
backlash, dooming interracial cooperation, and pushing” young black activists “into an
unabated orgy of domestic violence in the name of revolution. Black power is most often
seen as triggering the demise of the civil rights era.”63 This narrative overlooks the role of
black power in establishing and strengthening cultural and ethnic pride, self-determinism
of communities, and localized community activism. 64 This focus on the community and
the local as an aspect of black power did not burst onto the scene in the mid 1960’s, but
16

had instead always been a powerful and integral part of the civil rights movement, both in
Louisville and in cities around the country, including New York, Detroit, Chicago, and
Oakland.65
However, the man of that focus on the local changed in the late 1960’s. WECC,
though they continued to work for open housing and an integrated West End, realized
that “empowering the West End meant empowering blacks.”66 In presenting this shift in
ideology, WECC acknowledged that efforts to halt the segregation of the West End had
largely failed, and that the area now represented a primarily African American
population. In this sense, “empowering blacks” meant empowering the communities
WECC had always sought to empower. As such, acceptance of and use of Black Power
rhetoric not so much a sharp shift in ideology or methods, but an outgrowth of the
organization’s founding principles. Though they continued to work for items beneficial to
all West End residents, such as a health center, they also began programs focusing on
African American heritage and cultural pride. 67
WECC supported a variety of organizations and initiatives under their new Black
Power trajectory. Among these were the Louisville Welfare Rights Organization
(LWRO), the Louisville Arts Workshop, and the Black Workers’ Coalition (BWC). They
also founded the Black Urban League of Kentucky (BULK) to, among other initiatives,
work to organize African American West End youth. Charles Tachau, WECC’s white cochairman, recruited Sam Hawkins, Robert Sims, and Willie Coggins to head the
organization in October 1967. Sam Hawkins and Robert Sims had previously worked
together while working as members in SCLC (Southern Christian Leadership Council). 68
Aiming to “‘teach black people to think black’”, BULK prepared a black culture
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curriculum which taught a variety of topics designed to create an African American selfconscious identity. Ruth Bryant stated that:

“It was black history, getting black history in the schools of Louisville and
to this end the Black Unity League was organized to study black history,
that’s all. And we had black history classes for all black students, from
elementary through high school who wanted to come up to West End
Community Council for the courses. We asked teachers and people who
had done research in black history to come in and speak and it was nice.”69
Working towards this end with support from WECC, as well as a grant from VISTA
workers and from the Episcopal church in New York secured by Charles Tachau, BULK
planned workshops to teach the material and worked to get the curriculum implemented
in local schools, eventually securing an agreement from the Board of Education that led
to limited success.70 BULK also sponsored a “Soul Session” in early 1968, followed by a
later and larger “Black is Beautiful Festival”. BULK also worked with university students
to establish black student unions at state colleges and universities. 71 These bread and
butter issues focused on African American identity and self-concept embodied much of
the Louisville iteration of the Black Power Movement.
Sylvia Mangahan, writing to The Louisville Defender, praised these efforts by
BULK and others:
“I’m grateful to the ‘black power’ folks for doing something that I never
got to do for myself. What has been going on in the schools for
generations has not been merely whitewashing, but WASPwashing. And I
was WASPwashed too, and hated every minute of the that aspect of
school. Due to the efforts of the proponents of Black Culture education, it
won’t be so easy to WASPwash everyone. This is a good effect aside from
the intrinsic merits of Black Cultural education.”72
BULK sought to foster the concept of a unified and aware black public, for “in order to
alter social conditions, blacks first had to change the way they looked at themselves.”73
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As has been seen through their connection with WECC, BULK, and other
organizations, the black church remained important in Louisville civil rights and
constituted a variety of publics in and of themselves. Ordained ministers such as Charles
Tachau, A.D. King, and others served prominently in civil rights organizations or worked
closely with organization leaders. “‘Civil rights movement was born in the churches and
this is where the bulk of the people are and this is the way we’re going to get things done
is through church support,’” Ruth Bryant recalls A.D. King telling her. Such religious
figures continued to hold important positions in Louisville’s black public, and black
churches continued to serve as meeting places and as centers of civil rights activity
despite the rhetoric of Louisville’s publics became increasingly secular.
Meanwhile, Ken Clay, a staff member with the Community Action Commission
(CAC), opened the Corner of Jazz. The store “displayed pictures of Malcolm X and
Muhammad Ali, sold African clothes and art, and hosted discussions of black art and
culture.”74 WECC worked to persuade other businesses in the West End to hire African
American workers and to make sure the rights of those workers were protected. Robert
Cunningham worked to form a Black Worker’s organization. 75 The concerns of white
officials that such efforts as the Corner of Jazz store, the black student unions, and the
other actions of WECC and its allies were inherently separatist and militant were
unfounded. However, the changing dynamics of the black public sphere did open room
for expression within the African American community for doubt about the intentions of
whites.
Ruth Bryant recalled that “I tried to involve some of the white women I had been
friendly with…I found out they were going around saying I was an anarchist…wouldn’t
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march for housing, you see, that kind of thing.”76 Another West End resident wrote in to
The Louisville Defender that “I have many whites ask “What can we do?” to help relieve
or extirpate the racial tension, and I am wondering if they are really sincere or do they
want to do just enough to pacify the Negro?”77 Of course, African Americans in the
increasingly segregated West End had seen and experienced enough discrimination and
indifference by Louisville’s white population and administration to plant those seeds of
doubt. Like the violence accused of it, Black Power neither fostered nor created such
ideas in Louisville. Its efforts to create an African American identity and black public
sphere, simply allowed for the expression of such sentiments.
In Louisville, narratives of black power played out in both the civil rights
community and in the city leadership. The Louisville Defender opened their January 4
issue of the weekly paper with a 1966 retrospective in which was headlined with
statement that “1966 Was Shaped by ‘Black Power’, ‘Backlash’.”78 The author, Nat
Tillman, goes on to describe the divide that black militancy and rhetorics of violence
caused between different civil rights groups and eventually led to a white backlash during
the 1966 elections.79 This perceived backlash was limited to white voters for, despite the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, African Americans that had formerly been denied the polls in
the south and elsewhere still found their ability to vote threatened and impeded in a
variety of ways.80
This backlash was not limited to elections. As some civil rights publics around the
country adopted Black Power affiliations, which carried with them the assumption of
more violent and separatist rhetorical positions, white city administrations became more
concerned with preventing the possibility of violence than with seeking cooperation in
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advancing civil rights concerns. 81 This is not to say that Louisville’s government ever
displayed more than a begrudging willingness to allow civil rights concessions within the
city, but they, like other Southern cities that deemed themselves “progressive” in their
treatment of race issues, had earlier made moves to maintain that veneer of
progressivism.82 Of course, this was a progressivism repeatedly challenged by
Louisville’s civil rights publics. One of these was the Louisville Human Rights
Commission, headed by Dr. Maurice Rabb, who challenged segregation in the police
department. Speaking to Louisville’s progressive image versus its reality, Rabb
referenced an editorial in The Louisville Defender, stating “ ‘For too long Louisville has
basked in the false glory of a desegregated police department when in actuality it was not
true.”83 In challenging segregation in the police force, Rabb, and the editorial he draws
from, utilize non-Southern comparisons in order to further their civil rights agenda.84
Ruth Bryant recalled that:
“The thing that I resented very deeply…was when they called the city
officials…we called them in and when the women from Southwick called
them they would come but they treated them with such disrespect. There
was all the difference in the world between the way they them and the way
they treated me; at least they kept their amenities with me but with them
they were very rude with no respect at all.”85
Like in other civil rights struggles, activists were expected to work within very narrow
and paternalistic channels of civility that narrowly circumscribed interaction between
white city leaders and leaders within the African American community. 86 When asked
whether Mayor Schmied was willing to work with her and other community leaders, Ruth
Bryant responded, “No. He said that he liked friendly criticism…I don’t know what he
meant by friendly criticism but he didn’t get friendly criticism, he got harsh criticism.”87
One area where Louisville African Americans in the latter years of the 1960’s,
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like other cities in the north, did not see significant mass backlash was from the white
populace, though demonstrations in Louisville in the early part of the decade had met
with white violence.88 However, during the sit-ins in 1960, the one of the greatest
impediment to their eventual success was still the arrest of more than six hundred
protesters.89 Pockets of protest existed, but not on the level of the white mobs typical of
the southern movement during the early 1960’s. In 1967 and 1968, the danger to civil
rights protestors came not from the white populace, but from the police and other arms of
the city administration.
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Chapter III: Community Organizing for Open Housing
“The core problem within the ghetto is the vicious circle created by the lack of decent
housing, decent jobs and adequate education. The failure of these three fundamental
institutions to work has led to alienation of the ghetto from the rest of the urban area as
well as to deep political rifts between the two communities...Urban renewal and highway
clearance programs have forced black people more and more into congested pockets of
the inner city.” – Kwame Ture and Charles V. Hamilton, Black Power: The Politics of
Liberation90

By 1967, Black Power, in its multiple iterations, misconceptions, and movements,
was in full swing both as the dominant rhetoric of the continuing civil rights struggle and
in a mainstream consciousness frightened by this ostensibly new and unapologetically
aggressive African American rhetoric. 91 Urban violence had become a more and more
consistent part of the American landscape, with violence in Newark in July, set off after a
police officer had severely beaten an African American man, only one in a string of
ghetto uprisings.92 More violence followed the speeches and public appearances of
Stokely Carmichael throughout 1966 and 1967. “For the moment,” Peniel Joseph writes
in chronicling the history of the Black Power Movement, “Black Power remained a
revolution whose spokesman gave voice to – rather than inspired – the outrage of the
masses from below.”93
Police brutality served as a visible sign of the continued oppression of white
governments and their recalcitrance to grant the full extent of civil rights victories or to
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address continued inequality. Nat Tillman, in his summary of 1966, wrote that:
“Community action programs designed to aid the poverty-affected from
head-start programs to jobs for adult poor came into being and the poor
could look for a brighter tomorrow. But alas, the stepped-up war in Viet
Nam had its effect towards the end of 1966 and the poor found themselves
again becoming victims, this time of a shortage of anti-poverty funds.”94
This scenario played out in Louisville similarly to how it played out across the country.
Poverty programs that had shown great promise saw budgets cut drastically to fund the
escalation of the Vietnam War, so that “the battle against poverty, against slums, against
hunger and all the nightmarish things with which the poor are so acquainted, will have to
wait until the end of the war.”95 This limited the power of community programs, often
maintained in cooperation with local activist groups and individuals, that had, according
to Sugrue in Sweet Land of Liberty, “unleashed and legitimized an insurgent movement
for “community control” that dovetailed with the growing demand for black power.”96
This shift created “alternative institutions to unresponsive local governments.”97 Coupled
with the Black Power rhetoric of community nationalism, this localized the civil rights
movement, refocusing it on disputes between local governments and activist groups, a
vital change from the large organizations lobbying for federal change in the narrative of
the heroic civil rights movement.
Many African Americans hoped for renewal of these programs, which had shown
promise in their short period of operation, though no new federal funds appeared to
“bring renewed vigor to the badly faltering ‘war on poverty’...Most harmful were the
sharp cuts in the community action programs.”98 Community programs continued, with
urban leagues and other community groups working to bring youth training centers, adult
education, and other hopeful enterprises to Louisville’s West End. 99 However, their
continued operations were carried out largely without the federal funding that had been
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previously contributed.
As the impact of federal assistance to these ‘alternative institutions’ in this local
dynamic faded, the activist groups that had supported them and the local governments
that they had challenged fell into direct confrontation, both in Louisville and elsewhere.
In Louisville, WECC (West End Community Council), BULK (Black Unity League of
Kentucky), and WLCM (West Louisville Cooperative Ministry) continued their work to
further Louisville civil rights. Each of these groups constituted a public as previously
defined, though there were multiple instances of these groups working either with each
other or with groups from the state or national level to further individual causes. 100
Louisville’s black public continued to seek to evolve and redefine itself in the face of
these new and continuing struggles. This growing confrontation between local
community groups and Louisville’s city government over increasingly contentious issues
such as open housing was not new to civil rights in the latter half of the decade. What
was absent were the markers of success in public accommodations and landmark
legislation that had served to shift focus from the continued socioeconomic inequality of
large numbers of African Americans living in an increasingly segregated West End.
The vast majority of African Americans had been extremely enthusiastic for the
possibility that President Lyndon Johnson’s ‘War on Poverty’ would create true change
in poor urban communities. This enthusiasm was a hallmark of the heroic civil rights
movements, as African Americans continually demonstrated real faith in the federal
government to create positive social changes. In 1966, that support still stood firm, with
three quarters of African Americans expressing faith that the federal government was
“helpful”.101
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Less than a third of northern African Americans held the same opinion of their
local governments. Local governments, rightly, drew significant blame in continued
housing segregation, high rates of minority poverty, and stalled civil rights initiatives
such as improved integration or betterment of schools. 102 Frank L. Stanley, Sr., editor
and publisher of The Louisville Defender, in writing that “racial residential segregation is
the single greatest economic and social cost to every municipality in America...Louisville
must have freedom of residence if equality of opportunity in education, employment and
recreation is permanently to endure,” also asserted that it was the obstructionism of city
hall and the failure of Mayor Schmied to work with the Board of Aldermen that had
hampered the passing of an adequate open housing ordinance.
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He also cited the many

local African American groups that had studied the issue and made recommendations that
were ignored by city hall.104
In its capacity as the local iteration of the black press and the major voice of
Louisville’s black public, The Louisville Defender proved relentless in pushing for open
housing. In allowing prominent members of community groups a forum in which to
speak and in being a filter for the actions and words of said groups, The Louisville
Defender played a significant role in the popularity of particular figures and positions. In
particular, their antagonism of Mayor Kenneth Schmied and his office undoubtedly
played a major role in shaping public opinion of the progress of open housing legislation
in Louisville. In his editorial published May 30, 1968, several days after riots had
wreaked havoc in the west end, editor Frank Stanley, Sr. wrote that “the inability of local
negro leadership to contain the rioting in Louisville’s west-end rests upon the shoulders
of mayor Kenneth Schmied...Day long efforts to reach the mayor failed. City Hall aides
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told leaders of the negro community that the mayor was golfing and unavailable.”105 Such
words had far reaching effects in the African American community.
One other way in which The Louisville Defender worked to shape local rhetorics
was a dedication to reporting the work of publics committed to the maintenance of Great
Society social programs and other efforts to better the African American community both
outside of and including direct action activism. The trend towards community activism
did not dissipate with the decrease in federal funding. The Louisville and Jefferson
County Action Commission’s budget was supplemented by local funding from the city
and county governments and Boards of Education after federal funding to the program
was cut by almost 30%. Despite these extra funds, the Commission was still forced to cut
almost 63 professional employees and 30 non-professional employees, among them area
program coordinators and community organizers.106 This laying off if significant
numbers of largely African American community workers was worrisome. Thanks in
large part to the ‘war on poverty’ programs which were now seeing their funding slashed,
and the lack of choice created by continued discrimination in employment, the
government had become the largest employer of African Americans, and especially
college-educated African Americans, in northern cities. 107 In Louisville and elsewhere,
lack of funding marked the potential for dramatic reduction in the numbers of publicly
employed African Americans that were employed on roads to both roles of political
leadership and middle class status.108
The Director of the Louisville Urban League, Charles Steele, stressed the
importance of local anti-poverty programs and the need for their continued operation to
creating change for Louisville’s poor. 109 Groups like the Louisville and Jefferson County
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Human Rights Commission continued to work to create local change by working with the
city government.110 The Committee on Open Housing, a conglomeration of other
community groups on prominent individuals, also formed to develop recommendations
for a robust open housing ordinance. 111 This committee represented one of several joint
efforts by Louisville’s activist publics to reach consensus views on important issues,
particularly housing, though their efforts were not typically utilized by the city
administration.
Still working with WECC as well as a variety of other groups, Ruth Bryant
became one of the faces of Louisville civil rights across the country. Starting in 1963, she
had begun to attend the Race Relations Institute at Fisk University, and continued her
attendance every summer through 1967. During this period, she had also attended two
national conferences for the National Committee against Discrimination and Housing
(NCDH). It was there that she learned of the NCDH idea to use “model cities as a tool to
secure open housing in cities…and Louisville was a model city.”112
Working with the new Open Housing Committee, which met in A.D. King’s
Church and included many of Louisville’s civil rights leaders including Charles Tachau
of WECC, Bryant and the Committee decided to use the grants associated with NCDH’s
model cities for leverage against Louisville government. Ruth Bryant recalled that in the
position state they drafted and sent to city hall “we said that if they did not give us open
housing that they were not going to have a demonstration city project, a model city
project here in this city.”113 The Open Housing Committee continued to meet, contacting
activists both in and outside Louisville. In her work outside of the city, Ruth Bryant had
made contacts with people in Washington D.C. that the committee maintained contact
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with, as well as with the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development offices in
Atlanta, continuing to work a multitude of angles, especially the city’s lack of
compliance with the model city guidelines. Despite the potential of the committee’s
efforts losing the city several million dollars, according to Ruth Bryant, they continued to
work with very limited cooperation from city hall. 114
Frank L. Stanley, Sr., in stressing the need for open housing laws, concluded with
the unwished for alternative: “unrest and vivid disobedience on the part of both, the
aggrieved and their enlightened sympathizers to the disgrace and shame of our city.”115
While Black Power was an important and powerful rhetoric to African American activists
in Louisville, it did not carry with it the explicit threat or promise of violence. Civil
disobedience, when it came later that year, would be the result of frustration over the
obstructionism of local government, such as Frank L. Stanley, Sr.’s assertion of the
Mayor’s repeated efforts to “intimidate or negatively influence the Board of
Aldermen.”116
However, later in the same issue, Whitney M. Young, Executive Director of the
National Urban League, stated his wish that the president would issue an executive order
that would accomplish the same safeties against housing discrimination that the defeated
Civil Rights Act of 1966 would have had. Despite President Johnson’s failure to issue the
executive order in 1966, Young stated his continued hope that the new year would see
such a presidential action.117 In cases like this, even as civil rights refocused to
community efforts against local governments, many national organizations still sought to
further civil rights causes and many African Americans still hoped for aid from a federal
government whose attentiveness to domestic racial issues was quickly waning as other
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issues pushed to the forefront.
Frank L. Stanley, Sr. echoed this dichotomy of opinion a week later when he, in
his editorial “The Die is Cast”, again railed against Mayor Schmied’s weakening of the
proposed open housing ordinance, as well as that of Judge Cook, a candidate for
Kentucky governor, before concluding on the fear that local legislation was stymied
unless the federal “high office itself” would force change. 118 Federally mandated change
and enforcement in housing and other issues remained continually absent or haphazardly
implemented in the late 1960’s, in Louisville and across the north. Meanwhile, local
distrusts continued to simmer.
In many cases what was later construed as black separatism, though that did exist,
leading Nat Tillman to reference it amid other civil rights concerns in 1966, was in large
part this growing community nationalism, assisted by now defunded federal programs
and fueled by distrust of the city government. African Americans sought to control their
own destinies and protect their own communities, while continuing the struggle to
increase opportunities within those communities. An arena where this divide between
black power’s community nationalism and more traditional conceptions of civil rights
gains was the changing attitudes of African Americans in Louisville towards school
desegregation.
Lyman Johnson had maintained a prominent status among civil rights activists
and Louisville’s African American community since his lawsuit in 1949 had
desegregated the University of Kentucky and his subsequent years serving as a Louisville
school teacher at Central (Colored) High School in downtown Louisville, from the
1930’s through the 1960’s. He also served as an assistant principal in Jefferson County
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schools as well as being instrumental in securing equal pay for African American
teachers in the district and in district efforts at school desegregation in the 1970’s. 119
Despite Lyman Johnson’s groundbreaking judicial victory in 1949, and the subsequent
civil rights victory as the University of Louisville was fully desegregated two years later
in 1951, initial efforts by the Louisville School Board to follow suit with the city’s public
schools did not meet with the same success. However, despite continued de facto
segregation, Jefferson County Public Schools were applauded in the wake of the 1954
Brown v. Board of Ed ruling met with success and national praise as their efforts resulted
in peaceful change instead of violence. 120
Such apparent initial successes in school integration, while at least symbolically
substantial, did not solve the major racial disparities between schools in the district. A
variety of solutions were proposed over the next decade, culminating in the early 1970’s
with the idea for busing to generate a desired racial makeup of all schools in the city.
Efforts at “racial balancing” before then involved redrawing neighborhood lines or
separating students along criteria other than geographic lines so as to maintain an even
racial distribution across schools. Neville Tucker, an African American lawyer and civil
rights advocate as well as member of the Louisville School Board and proponent of
“racial balancing”, resigned from the school board following the negative response of
African American parents to his ideas on May 27, 1968, the same night violence erupted
in the Parkland neighborhood of Louisville.
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This rejection of Neville Tucker’s redistricting plan represented a break from the
accepted narrative of school desegregation. While it by no means constituted an example
of unanimous dissent, it does demonstrate the increased importance of the African
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American community in Louisville. The African American community remained
committed to bettering the educational opportunities of its children, and a majority still
saw an end to de facto school segregation as the means to that end. However, many
Louisville groups and individuals worked towards alternative means towards improving
education, often with community-based initiatives that largely bypassed large scale
changes in school populations. “The concept of community control has now rooted itself
in the consciousness of many black people,” Stokely Carmichael had written a year
earlier in Black Power.122 However, many activists and African American parents
continued to work for school integration because “they knew the only way to get quality
education was to have white pupils in the school.”123
The primary reason that an end to enforced school segregation over a decade
before had done little to alleviate the segregated nature of the county’s and the city’s
public schools was the issue of informally segregated housing in Louisville. Among a
myriad of other issues, this created largely racially homogenous neighborhoods that,
though assigned to a desegregated school, still maintained widely disparate racial
makeups across different areas of the district.
These homogenous schools and neighborhoods were not unchanging areas within
the West End with longstanding racial identities. During the late 1950’s and 1960’s, these
neighborhoods were actually becoming more predominantly African American, even in
West End neighborhoods that had been historically interracial. These new African
American neighborhoods, now more isolated from identification with the city as whole,
turned more heavily towards community activism through the construction of new
community identities.
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This community identity and burgeoning black public, fostered by WECC,
BULK, and others, and the organization’s associated activism targeted the housing
practices that had forced so many African Americans into largely poor, subpar West End
housing. Black power rhetoric allowed a means for African Americans to come together
and retain agency and, though centered on the community, was by no means an
acquiescence to the effects of Urban Renewal projects or unfair housing practices.
Lyman Johnson would later describe the 1968 riots by saying that “a racial
disturbance that we had in 1968 was really a continuation of the agitation for better
housing, better accommodations for the blacks.”124 The struggle for open housing was not
simply a matter of where one would live, or what part of town one’s house would be in,
but the quality of the conditions in which African Americans lived. Hence Lyman
Johnson’s emphasis on the betterment of housing accommodations for African
Americans. A.D. Williams King, in an editorial to The Louisville Defender, added the
factor that housing prices and rental rates in the West End were higher than in the rest of
the city despite the higher quality of the properties in other areas of the Louisville, a
factor common in urban ghettoes across the north. According to A.D. King, retail stores,
insurance rates, and other items also suffered from West End markups.125 The West End
remained overcrowded, overwhelmingly poor, yet overpriced and underdeveloped,
conditions which grew worse throughout the decade. Open housing represented the
possibility of escape from the “increasing decay and bitterness of our cities” and “the
inhuman conditions of ghetto life.”126
Struggle by WECC and others for open housing laws became one of the major
factors in civil rights after 1964 and one which incurred its most violent opposition as an
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increasing frustrated black public struggled against an increasingly conservative city hall.
Open housing discussions began in earnest in Louisville, propelled by the successful
passage in 1963 of an open accommodation ordinance that promised unsegregated access
to public places for African Americans.127 Coupled with this movement was growing
agitation by African Americans and civil rights organizations over ongoing Urban
Renewal projects, whose design was ostensibly intended to foster economic growth in
dying city centers but which, as seen in John Anderson’s 1976 assessment, usually “in
practice meant razing poor and minority neighborhoods and replacing them with large
construction projects”.128
Whitney Young agreed with both of these analyses of such projects when he
stated in The Louisville Defender his fears that if open housing legislation was not
passed, then “our cities are doomed and will perpetuate Negro ghettos ringed by a ‘white
noose’ of suburbs, harmful to both human values and the ideals of democratic life.”129
Lyman Johnson remembers the urban renewal projects as operating thusly:
“Originally there were many Negroes living up around Tenth and
Chestnut, Tenth, Ninth, say Twelfth, down to Fifteenth. Ah, say between,
ah, Walnut and Broadway. Now urban renewal went through and that
section and tore down the old shacks and houses the blacks had been
living in -- were just completely demolished, with no provisions made for
the people who inhabited that area...when they were uprooted, the lending
agencies would not provide, and the real estate agencies would not provide
homes outside of the West End...So these Negroes had to crowd into the
places that were being vacated by the whites who were taking what we
commonly call ‘white flight’...Now the riot that took place in 1968 was a
result of the resentment of being forced into one section…”130
As becomes clear from Lyman’s Johnson’s statement, though the city guaranteed
relocation, poor African Americans typically found themselves moved into overcrowded
slums. This process dramatically increased the segregation of neighborhoods in
Louisville as more and more African Americans became concentrated in West End
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neighborhoods, which already suffered from poor housing conditions. The “Louisville
Survey West: Final Report”, completed in April 1977 by the Preservation Alliance of
Louisville and Jefferson County, Inc., discussed this “massive exchange of property”
from white homeowners in the west end and African Americans moving into the area,
forced out of other Louisville areas by urban renewal programs which, at their height, the
report claims, left a huge swath of emptied but undeveloped land between the primarily
African American west end and the west of Louisville. “It should be remembered”, the
report states amid a description of these conditions, “that the racial exchange in western
Louisville was primarily a replacement of white middle-class families by black middleclass families. There was no significant change in median family income, house value, or
educational attainment”.131 This version of the housing changes in Louisville in the
1960’s, though depicting the ‘white flight’ and urban renewal programs that defined it,
paints little of Johnson’s picture of overcrowding and resentment.
These practices, especially the tendency of many white residents of the West End
to leave rather than remain in integrated neighborhoods, led to other housing problems in
the city, such as the issue of “blockbusting”. This practice involved the selling of housing
in a predominantly white neighborhood to African Americans, then either encouraging or
supporting the desires of the other white homeowners in the area to sell at a loss so as to
“escape” the neighborhood, then reselling to more African Americans at inflated prices
for maximum profits. WECC was formed with the primary goal being to combat this
practice and to “ ‘help the west end become an integrated community’.”132 WECC
attacked the problem of an increasingly segregated residential Louisville in two ways, by
sponsoring get-acquainted block meetings, neighborhood clubs, and arts events in various
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neighborhoods to promote the idea of integrated communities, and by lobbying the city
government for open housing legislation in all of Louisville. Mayor William O. Cowger,
Louisville’s mayor until 1965, and his administratio n, though speaking publicly of
support for integrated housing in the early 1960’s, had backed only voluntary initiatives
without any provisions for punishment of segregationist practices.
Describing the effect of Urban Renewal on Louisville’s African American
neighborhoods, John Anderson of the University of Louisville wrote that:
“By 1950 spatially separate black communities evolved, each having
distinctive nomenclature and identity. Exchange of property from white to
black residents led to expansion and by 1970 black housing areas were
consolidated into a more continuous zone of urban space…
By 1970, the black residential areas consisted of nearly 78,000 people,
including over ninety percent of the city’s black residents.”133
In addition to working for open housing initiatives, Louisville’s civil rights organizations
sought to combat real estate practices that furthered segregation in the West End. The
Kentucky Commission on Human Rights even dispersed pamphlets to homeowners in the
area entitled “Fair Housing: Myth vs. Fact”, both to encourage open housing practices
and to combat panic selling and other blockbusting techniques by allaying the racial
concerns of Louisville’s white residents. 134
Mayor Schmied, Cowger’s successor, spoke of the possibility of strengthening the
voluntary code of ethics for housing practices during his election campaign in the autumn
of 1965, but he continued his opposition to any inclusion in the legislation of jail time or
other punishment for persons caught in discriminatory housing practices. In 1966 he had
opposed stronger laws proposed by WECC, the NAACP, and KCLC (Kentucky Christian
Leadership Conference), a new organization ran by A.D. King, Martin Luther King’s
brother.135 His office had pressured the Board of Aldermen as to the wording of the
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proposed ordinance and recommended public hearings that, to African Americans in the
west end whose voices had been previously ignored, seemed little more than continued
obstruction, while others feared that the hearings would actually weaken the law’s
already questionable methods of enforcement.
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Representatives of the Louisville

Commission on Human Rights met with Mayor Schmied and the Board of Aldermen on
multiple occasions in attempts to circumvent just such weakenings occurring. 137
The Louisville Defender continued its weekly commentary on the struggles of the
mayor’s office, the Board of Aldermen, and civil rights leaders to create a strong housing
ordinance that would discourage housing discrimination. This process involved as many
seeming backward steps as it did progress, which mainly concentrated around the
specifics of enforcement of the law and penalties for breaking it. Coupled with this,
Stanley also spoke out against efforts to revise the existing city public accommodations
law, removing the potential of a $100 fine for offenders and weakening ions in other
significant ways. Stanley, speaking both as The Louisville Defender and as a major voice
in the African American community, wrote explicitly that he is “opposed to the revision
of the Louisville public accommodations ordinance...’Never a backward step!’.”138
As the debate over specifics of the proposed open housing legislation drug on
through 1966 and into early 1967, civil rights leaders in the community began to threaten
demonstrations and protests, and that if the issue were not handled soon “restiveness and
overt action” in the form of marches and demonstrations such as the city had seen several
years earlier would be inevitable. 139 John Anderson’s later study of the housing
segregation in Louisville asserted that the fact that “greater portions of black residents are
living in black majority areas…are closely associated with many of the urban problems
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and issues of our time.”140 It was this, rather than any Black Power rhetoric influencing
Louisville’s black public, that fed the threats of open demonstrations and the growing
unrest within the West End during the heightening open housing debates of 1967.
Demonstrating the cooperation between civil rights publics with differing
professed ideologies and the continued, though lessoned, impact of national organizations
on local movements, SCLC (Southern Christian Leadership Conference) sent
“technicians” to begin organizing local groups for a massive protest campaign to force
the city government’s hand.141 When SCLC officials did arrive in Louisville, first they
met with city officials to ascertain details of the city’s ongoing housing strife. 142 One of
the local SCLC organizers was Robert Sims, who, along with Sam Hawkins, would be
appointed to head BULK later in 1967 and would become major players the following
year in the riots and the ensuing “Black Six” trial.
The first of Mayor Schmied’s open public forums for Louisville citizens to voice
their opinion on open housing legislation took place February 2, 1967.143 The fiery
rhetoric and hostility displayed at the public hearing, held at Southern High School in the
Okolona area of southern Jefferson County, an area almost exclusively white, displayed
the stringent opposition faced by the WECC and other groups pushing for integrated
housing laws.144 Coupled with this rising opposition was rising support from other
Louisville groups and individuals, many of them white and living in primarily white
areas. What was then seen by city hall as public outcry against the housing law led to
exactly what civil rights groups and leaders had feared, another proposed housing
ordinance, at least as marred by weakness as the first. Despite the combined efforts the
vast majority of Louisville’s civil rights advocating publics, utilizing the majority of
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rhetorical tools then on the table, the new ordinance lacked all fines or jail times as
penalties for violations of the proposed law. In addition, individual homeowners were
exempted from coverage by the new law.145
In a speech delivered by J. Mansir Tydings, executive director of the Louisville
Human Relations Commission, in Muncie, Indiana, and reprinted in its entirety in The
Louisville Defender, Tydings stated that civil rights progress had stalled in recent years
because “cries of ‘black power’, ‘insurrection’, ‘lawlessness’ have characterized what the
press has labeled the ‘white backlash’...Negro organizations became disunited.”146 He
went on to state that “many of the disruptions of the past summer took place in areas
where tensions is [sic] strong and hope is weak; where unemployment is high, and dropouts numerous.”147 Despite this, Tydings spoke out against the militarism of groups such
as the Black Panthers, citing seven unnamed civil rights leaders who recently spoke out
against ‘black power’ and violence. In concluding, he urged cooperation and for the
direction of a moderate civil rights leadership. 148
Coming as it did on the heels of the weakened housing law in Louisville and
severe increase in tensions and discontent over the city government’s cooperation with
civil rights leadership to make progress, it is hard to construe Tydings comments as
anything other than directed at discontent Louisville publics who continued to threaten
city hall with the possibility of protests. Along with Lyman Johnson and other
individuals, it also demonstrates the continued diversity in civil rights rhetoric in 1967.
Multiple iterations of Black Power ideology were at play in Louisville’s black public, in
some cases by individuals who repudiated Black Power as they understood it on the
national level.
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Though Harry S. McAlpin, along with other moderate members of Louisville’s
black public, spoke out publicly against street demonstrations over housing law, claiming
that such forms of protest should only be utilized after a complete breakdown in
communication between city hall and civil rights groups, something that had not yet
happened. These moderate leaders such as McAlpin, Bishop Tucker, and others, had
previously spoken out against the efficacy of street demonstrations, being instead content
to, “let the Schmied administration set the pace” of progress. 149 Other African Americans
and civil rights activists were far from willing to allow the city administration that
authority. WECC, along with five representatives of the Southern Christian leadership
Conference (SCLC), began to plan peaceful protests. 150 Demonstrations began on March
7, 1967, with spokesmen for the Committee on Open Housing claiming demonstrations
would continue until an acceptable open housing law met all their conditions. 151
The marches and demonstrations grew throughout the week, aided by
representatives from the NAACP regional conference which was meeting in Louisville at
the time. On March 14, during a sit-in at a Board of Aldermen meeting, police cleared out
the protesters by force, leading at least one protester to claim that he was stomped on by
an over-aggressive policeman. After that event, and accusations of police violence at a
rally the following day, the mayor called on local activists to repudiate their outside allies
in the sake of peace in the city. This led SCLC and Martin Luther King Jr. to intensify
their focus on Louisville and its stalled open housing legislation.
As demonstrations increased, so did claims of violence and police brutalization.
Ruth Bryant recalls that Hosea Williams, one of the chief SCLC aides, herself, and others
went marching one night and “there was an encounter with the police…his pants were all
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torn and his shorts were showing and he was going to get those police…It becomes very
subjective and very personal when a person is physically attacked.”152 In another incident
during the demonstrations, Martin Luther King, Jr. and his brother, A.D. King, were
driving when a brick was thrown at them through the car’s open window. “That night at
St. James Methodist Church over there at Twenty-Sixth and Oak, he [Martin Luther
King, Jr.] held that rock in his hand and he was madder than I’d ever seen him before,”
Ruth Bryant recalled.153 In August 1967, Sims and Hawkins were arrested for arson
despite multiple witnesses vouching for the two activists’ presence at an open housing
demonstration blocks away. Unable to pay their unreasonably high bail, the two remained
in jail until they were acquitted in October. This and other events led Charles Tachau to
warn that West End residents, “both black and white, were losing faith in the police.”154
Other cities and counties in Kentucky did take actions to pass fair housing
ordinances, including Covington, which was followed shortly by all of Kenton County,
and Fayette County. In Louisville, an election of aldermen in November led to an
overwhelming Democratic majority on the Board of Aldermen. The new Board passed an
opening housing ordinance on December 13, 1967. The following March, the state of
Kentucky passed a fair housing act as well. 155
However, like school segregation in Louisville, legislation did not ensure
equality. The Council on Religion and Race opened and ran a Housing Information
Service to assist African Americans find housing in Louisville. In 1969, the State
Commission on Human Rights opened Housing Opportunity Centers to work towards the
same purpose. Despite all of this, segregated housing in Louisville continued to be a
problem that manifested itself in multiple ways, working to shape the power dynamics
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and the ideologies of the Louisville populace, both black and white, in ways beyond the
arena of housing.156 “With ‘white flight’ and the riots of the late 1960’s in the black
residential areas of western Louisville, the barren urban renewal landscape became a new
physical and psychological dividing line between the ‘Black West End’ and the rest of
Louisville”.157 This separation, both physical and mental, would lead directly into the
movements that became the 1968 riots.
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Chapter IV: Days of Rage and Riot
“Blame should not be placed on “outside agitators” or on “Communist influence” or on
advocates of Black Power. That dynamite was placed there by white racism and it was
ignited by white racist indifference and unwillingness to act justly.” - Kwame Ture and
Charles V. Hamilton, Black Power: The Politics of Liberation158

Under the prevailing narrative of civil rights, in the south and nationally, Black
Power rhetoric led to expressions of rage by what Lyman Johnson termed the “more
irrational--emotional young people”. These youth took out their resentment against all
things white in the form of uncontrolled, unproductive, and illogical riots. 159 This
narrative is wrong.
In 1977, Lyman Johnson, despite also blaming irrational African American youth,
pointed to inequality in housing as the major cause of the 1968 riots, and it becomes easy
to see why he would refer to the violence as a continuation of the previous year’s
protests. The Schmied administration’s response to the demonstrations, continual
unwillingness to support substantive housing reform, and numerous stories of police
antagonism and brutality against demonstrators all served to increase the frustrations and
anger within the West End. But the housing demonstrations themselves were a piece of
the far larger puzzle, the culmination of years of community and individual efforts to gain
equality in housing. However, such gains were met with consistent opposition from racist
individuals and groups in Louisville as well as an administration in the mayor’s office
under Mayor Schmied more interested in maintaining order than in eliciting change.
These were characteristics of open housing movements across the north, and the 1967
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demonstrations in Louisville had been noteworthy largely because of their lack of any
significant violence. “Violence showed its ugly head throughout 1966,” wrote Nat
Tillman of The Louisville Defender in January 1967, “Riots occurred in Chicago, New
York, St. Louis, and other northern cities as the bitterness generated by ghetto living
boiled over.”160
A. Phillip Randolph, testifying before a Senate subcommittee in January 1967,
drew similar conclusions, stating that “whites who want to hold Negroes back” and
“Negroes who distrust white people” were on a collision course towards violence. 161
Randolph blamed the reductions in the ‘war on poverty’ for the coming trouble, citing the
removal of the “little carrot” of those social programs as the cause, which alleviated
African Americans leaders of the blame. 162 Martin Luther King, Jr., who also testified,
agreed, citing a “failure to pursue justice” on the part of white governments as the
reason.163
Despite the hard fought gains that Louisville activists had won through SCLC’s
non-violent methods and techniques, frustration for clearer progress continued to mount.
For many, and especially the younger generation of activists and African Americans
growing up and operating in an increasingly segregated and poverty stricken West End,
the desire, and impatience, for more fully realized progress was growing. The civil unrest
of 1967 and the housing demonstrations had given these bitter elements of unrest a new
conception of their own power, of the relationship of their needs to the city leadership’s
goals and concerns. Black Power, the black press, and the continued work of local
activists continued to foster a black public. In the early days of her involvement with
WECC and the Mayor’s Advisory Committee, Ruth Bryant was angered to see African
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Americans from poor neighborhoods in the West End not only being disrespected by city
officials, but not even realizing that that they were being disrespected. 164 Public
demonstrations in 1967 and previously had already served as a statement by civil rights
organizations that the city government did not have complete control over the interactions
between the two groups. The same awareness, accompanied by frustration and anger, was
building among the rest of Louisville’s African American community. Two major events
in spring 1968, one on the national stage and one in Louisville, would continue to
exacerbate these already strained dynamics.
In 1967, the Louisville civil rights movement had grown increasingly localized,
with Louisville civil rights groups working with or against city government to create
change for the city’s African American population, primarily in the arena of open
housing. Even as prominent local publics sought to repudiate the racial violence that had
erupted in many northern cities over the previous months, local activists utilized the tools
of Black Power to foster community nationalism within the West End and across
Louisville.165 Black Power rhetoric, coupled with President Johnson’s flagging Great
Society programs and their focus on local community-based initiatives, served to refocus
civil rights at the local level, putting these localized publics in direct confrontation with
local governments that Louisville African Americans had long ago learned to distrust,
and whose continued stalling, recalcitrance, and sometimes brutal repression of protests,
organizations, and individuals fueled continued resentment.
Reduced funding for the federal programs that had worked to create this dynamic
exacerbated the tensions between the different groups, with civil rights publics adapting
new rhetorical positions and tools against an increasingly paranoid and obstructionist city
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government. Responding to media-fed fears of Black Power’s militant and violent
tendencies, city governments across the country moved from what they had claimed to be
working relationships with civil rights groups advocating Black Power positions, to even
more conservative positioning privileging “maintaining order” over continued progress.
In this, stalled civil rights progress by local governments in Louisville and other cities
was, at least in part, fueled by an increasingly vocal “white backlash” against potentially
enforced segregation in housing and education. White and media misconceptions of black
power formed erroneous narratives, asserting that “blacks wanted too much, too fast” and
recoiling “at the angry militancy of black power.”166
The struggle for effectively enforced open housing legislation in Louisville
demonstrated the changing approaches and willingness to reconstruct their rhetoric and
methodologies that typified the city’s African American activist publics. As
demonstrations over housing stretched over 1967, it was the city’s response that became
more militant, and accusations of police violence more common. Frustration over those
issues would explode in violence in May of 1968, as frustration and tension boiled over
to engulf the west end. Other factors would play significant roles, the activity of outside
agitators, the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., and continued housing disputes all
among them. However, this localization of the civil rights movement, pitting local groups
against local governments, and the frustrations resulting from a lack of progress in this
dynamic, lie at the heart of Louisville's outbreak of racial violence.

On May 7, 1968, police officer Michael Clifford pulled over Charles Thomas,
who was an African American schoolteacher and friends with Manfred Reid, who
witnessed Thomas being questioned by the police and stopped. Officer Clifford
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demanded that Reid step back and pushed him in the chest. According to Tracy E.
K’Meyer, “Reid recalled that, when he knocked the officer’s hand away, ‘He grabbed me
and started hitting me in the face. He hit me once with his open hand and then with his
fist.’ Reid was arrested for breach of peace and assault and battery. No charges were
brought against Thomas.”167 In his interview with David Cline in 2006, Reid stated that:
“We walked over and we asked what was wrong and whatever it was, it
was a conversation between him and the police. The one officer told us,
‘Niggers, get out of the street.’ We said, ‘Come on, man.’ So he pushed
me and so I said, ‘Okay, cool, I’ll get out of the street.’ So I started
backing up out of the street and he brings out this rubber club and hits me
and wow, man. At twenty-three, I just fired on him, I hit him, but he had
no reason to do that…I was charged with assault and battery of a police
officer and disorderly conduct, and he [Thomas] was charged with a bank
robbery, but he hadn’t robbed no bank.”168
Clifford was suspended awaiting a hearing after the immediate outcry from
multiple prominent civil rights groups. Both city hall and the initial police review upheld
the suspension despite calls for Clifford’s reinstatement by the Fraternal Order of Police.
On May 20, several hundred members of the SCLC Poor People’s Campaign moved
through the city and brief confrontations with police flared up but did not escalate.
Tensions between the many groups in Louisville grew past even the high levels that
housing issues had achieved, levels which Nat Tillman of the Louisville Defender, the
city’s African American newspaper, considered tinderbox conditions. 169 Reid believed
that, in light of the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr, only a little over a week
earlier, “everybody was looking for an issue or some reason by which they could express
their discontent.”170
On May 23, a Civil Service Board convened to consider the suspension and
possible reinstatement of Officer Clifford. Reid, though represented at the original
hearing, was not present at the Civil Services Board hearing, nor were any witnesses for
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him called to testify, though witnesses for Clifford were called. The Board then ruled to
suspend Clifford for fifteen days without pay and recommended his transfer from the
district, but reinstated him to the Louisville Police Department. 171 Within a week, the
Louisville Fraternal Order of Police voted to compensate Clifford for all lost pay during
his suspension. This led some African American members of the police force to protest
against this “cracker racism”, leading an African American police officer to tell the
Louisville Defender that this compensation is “a racial action led by known Klansmen in
the police department. There’s more race hate on the police force than there is
outside”.172
The Black Unity League of Kentucky, (BULK) and its leaders, particularly Sam
Hawkins and Robert Sims, called for protests to speak out against the reinstatement of
Clifford to the Louisville police force. 173 One of the outside activists invited to town by
Ruth Bryant and slated to speak at the rally was a man named James Cortez, from
Washington D.C., who was affiliated with SNCC, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating
Committee, and one of SNCC’s main members, Stokely Carmichael. Ruth Bryant recalls
meeting Coretz in Washington D. C.:
“And then this guy was attracted, I guess, to the people who were at the
table and he came over and introduced himself as Stokely’s assistant,
James Cortez. And then he said he had worked in the prison rights
movement or something like that, and he showed us pictures – he had a
briefcase, well, an attaché case – and he brought out all these pictures of
him and Stokely and things they had done together. He sounded like he
was hard enough and crude enough to come to Louisville and speak to our
black history classes where we were getting young blacks together to
listen to, to study black history.”174
Recalling a conversation with Robert Sims, Ruth Bryant asked Cortez to come to
Louisville to speak, hoping that his magnetic personality and “crude” sensibilities would
allow him to connect with some of the West End youth which the BULK members with
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college degrees or the ordained ministers with whom BULK and WECC worked had
struggled to reach. She asked Sam Hawkins, who would be in Washington a week later
for his work with the black history courses of the “National Sunday School Association
or something”, to go by SNCC headquarters and “check Cortez out.” Despite promises
that both Cortez and Carmichael would come to Louisville to speak, by Saturday only
Cortez had shown up, though he assured Bryant and others that Carmichael would arrive
on Monday.175 Lyman Johnson, who would speak against Cortez at his trial in 1970,
called Cortez “a person of ill repute” even though “the people didn’t know it, and he
came here to agitate and to ride into some sort of publicity perhaps, I guess he figured
he’d get a little fame out of leading a big riot against whitey”. 176
To assume that the motives of James Cortez were synonymous with the motives
of BULK, WECC or any of the local activists would be an unfounded assertion. More
doubt would be spread among Louisville’s black public in the following moths as the
rumors spread that Cortez was an FBI informant. 177 Turning the short amount of time
between his arrival in Louisville on Saturday May 25 and his arrest the following
Saturday on June 1, Cortez rose to a level of influence in Louisville because he tapped
into the frustration and anger of African American youth and “so several of the more
irrational--emotional young people jumped on his coat tail and well, the thing got out of
hand”178 as Lyman Johnson explained. Cortez exerted influence in different ways, both
wielding the power of the people he represented, in his role as the local representative of
SNCC and Stokely Carmichael, and as himself attempting to raise his own reputation by
utilizing the strength of his personality and his fiery oratory.179
Local civil rights activists met at the Zion Baptist Church on 22nd and Walnut to
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discuss possible responses to the reinstatement of Clifford. According to Lyman Johnson,
who was there, James Cortez rose at the end of the meeting and, without being called on
to speak, assumed the floor of the event while raising loud calls to violence and to “get up
and do something to get rid of whitey”.180 Johnson asked permission to speak against
what he perceived as Cortez’s dangerous vitriol, and, after being initially denied by the
presiding officer, was allowed to speak at the urging of the crowd. Johnson, in his
recollection, told the crowd that violence should be avoided and that the city’s problems
could be solved without violence. To this, Johnson remembers very clearly, Cortez
responded “Ladies and gentlemen, you can’t get rid of the whitey until you get rid of that
half black nigger”.181 Johnson continued urging peace and patience. Despite the violence
of the previous year against open housing demonstrators, Johnson and others still viewed
the civil rights movement in Louisville as peaceful. 182 No prominent Louisville
organizations or leaders had expressly come out in support of self-defense or any of the
more violent rhetoric espoused by Cortez.
The next day, representatives of several West End groups attempted to meet with
Mayor Schmied to discuss their objections to Clifford’s reinstatement. According to the
Courier Journal, the primary Louisville newspaper, the “Negro
delegation...unsuccessfully protested the reinstatement of Patrolman Michael Clifford in a
meeting with Mayor Schmied earlier in the day. However, Civil Rights in the Gateway to
the South: Louisville, Kentucky, 1945-1980, drawing mostly from the papers of James
Braden, asserts that the mayor’s assistant, Schrader Miller, did not allow them to meet
with the mayor at all, and sent them away, branding them troublemakers.
BULK held its public rally against Clifford’s reinstatement on Monday evening,
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May 27, 1968, at the corner of 28th and Greenwood. The decision to hold the rally
outdoors was made for several reasons. First and foremost, the organizers of the rally
operated on the belief in Cortez’s promise that Stokely Carmichael was coming to speak,
a matter of great excitement to many in the West End, and no church would hold the high
number of people gathering for such an event. Secondly, “you can get people like pimps
and prostitutes who would never go in a church but they would come out to 28 th and
Greenwood to hear him [Carmichael],” Ruth Bryant recalled being told. 183
Several businesses owned by African Americans, including an African bookstore
and the Corner of Jazz, were clustered near the intersection. 184 This area, according to
Lyman Johnson was “a nice little business community, business shopping area”.185 A
little further down 28th street, near Dumesnil, there were more businesses, to Johnson’s
recollection, that were owned primarily by white residents, “and the resentment was
against anything white, which I say was not altogether rational...when the riots came into
being and irrational elements under the leadership of ah, I won’t say leadership, under the
urging and prompting of a fellow who came in town called...Coretz”. 186
Speakers, including James Cortez, stood on the hood of a car to address the crowd
that had gathered for the rally. Ruth Bryant was in the African bookstore with her
children and other middle class members of the community, waiting to hear Carmichael
speak. She recalled that “I hadn’t seen Cortez, I hadn’t seen Sam [Hawkins], hadn’t seen
anybody, hadn’t been able to get in touch with anybody all day.”187 Carl Braden
remembered the police parked in alleyways during the rally, “not visible to people in the
street, but maybe to those on the rooftops.”188
Cortez, along with Charles X, an activist and member of the Louisville Nation of
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Islam mosque, urged the African Americans present to “assert black control over the
community”.189 Sims and Hawkins spoke and, though neither specifically endorsed
violence, both gave voice to their frustration with current racial conditions in the city and
their process of dealing with them, with Hawkins lamenting that times had changed since
he had marched with Martin Luther King Jr. earlier in the decade. Various speakers urged
the crowd to assert black control over their community and other calls to realize Black
Power within the West End.190
Manfred Reid recalled that:
“When I heard about the rally, I went down there and stood at a distance
and watched for a few minutes and they were just speaking, so I went
home. I’ve never really been in a protest. I really don’t believe in it…I
lived about eight or ten blocks from there – so then I just went home.
When the police got there, I wasn’t there.”191
Perhaps the most stimulating moment in the speeches occurred after Reid left, as
the speeches were concluding. Cortez claimed that Stokely Carmichael “was in a plane
circling the city and white officials were refusing to let it land”. 192 Ruth Bryant and her
family were walking back to the car across the street “—well, he [Carmichael] didn’t
come and Cortez said that Eastern Airlines wouldn’t let the plane land because Mr.
Carmichael was in it…well, you know, it sounded strange but, who knows.”193 Cortez
told the crowd to return once Carmichael finally arrived. However, according to Eastern
Airlines officials, Carmichael was not and had never been scheduled to speak in the city
and though two flights had been kept from landing that day due to mechanical
difficulties, Carmichael had not been listed on either of the incoming flights. 194 Also,
according to Sandy Leight, a Carmaichael aide and former SNCC employee in
Washington D.C. who was reached by The Courier Journal later in the week, Stokely
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Carmichael had never had plans to appear in Louisville at all. Despite this, Cortez’s claim
about Carmichael served to excite the crowd and the apparent obstruction by whites of
his landing and appearance served to anger them.
According to witnesses, the meeting broke up peacefully, despite Sims’ closing
declaration that future cases of police brutality would be met by “smoke signals” in the
West End.195 Eugene Robinson, newly appointed Associate Director of the city-county
Human Relations Commission, reported that the speeches given by Sims, Hawkins,
Cortez and another had not been instrumental in arousing passions. He cited the arrival of
a bus in the intersection, though police had ostensibly stopped traffic going into the
intersection. The bus, according to Robinson, drive through the crowded intersection
slowly but without braking or using its horn. The youths that had been hanging out on the
rooftops of the businesses surrounding the intersection threw rocks at the bus and,
according to Robinson, “‘that put the throwing idea in their mind.’”196
It was into the dispersing crowd that three police cars arrived, pulling into the
intersection, though other reports state that only one police cruiser pulled into the
intersection.197 The Courier Journal’s story on the events stated that “Sims climbed down
from the car roof, and the crowd began to disperse. But one of a group of about 25 Negro
youths perched atop the roof of the House of Champs Poolroom…threw a bottle into the
street, and the disturbance began.”198 According to Bud Dorsey, a freelance photographer
who was there, the cruisers had come to help the intersection clear out:
“About 30 young kids- about 11 or 12 years old- started throwing bottles
and bricks at the police. Right away the crowd started spreading out to get
out of the way...That’s what really started the whole thing off-the police
coming into the intersection and starting to clear it out...And they (the
police) didn’t fire back. They just stood there”. 199
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Dorsey and another, female witness even referenced two carloads of African
Americans driving through the intersection and firing weapons in the air without the
police taking action. Dorsey left to take his daughter home, but when he returned to the
intersection of 28th and Greenwood “it seemed like half the police department was there.
The teenagers were throwing stones through the windows of stores. The first place they
hit was the pawn shop – Lucky Morris pawn shop – then the grocery, and then the
cleaners.”200 Another witness claimed that “the boys were going in [to the stores]…About
80 boys were breaking in…There must have been about 25 police cars there.”201 Rioters
spread out in all directions as police left to return with more reinforcements. With
reinforcements, 500 firemen were called into the area and, by 11:30 that night, about four
hours after the rally had begun and three after it had ended, patrol cars were ordered to
accompany all firemen after two were hit with “missiles”. 202
Starting at the rally at 28th and Greenwood, police tracked disturbances across the
West End. The Courier Journal, in their coverage, termed the disturbances “outbreaks of
violence and looting” beginning at about 8:34 with the first police call and continuing
throughout the night.203 Within an hour of the first police call, police had reported at least
two cars set on fire and multiple reports of break-ins, looting, and destroyed property.204
Another Courier Journal article states that two police cruisers were damaged in the initial
barrage of rocks and bottles at 28th and Greenwood and that one of those cars was turned
over and set on fire as well. By 9:30 PM, Mayor Schmied had requested the state
National Guard be deployed in the city to assist in peace-keeping, a request granted by
Governor Louie B. Nunn. In addition, all county police and off-duty Louisville police
were mobilized.205
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Ruth Bryant recalled the events at 28 th and Greenwood:
“I looked around and Sam [Hawkins] was running with us. There were
young kids running and I saw fire and somebody said the cleaners was on
fire and people were literally running down the railroad tracks trying to get
as far away…I don’t know how the place caught on fire but to have gone
in the place was to break the law and to take stuff out was stealing;
therefore they were looters and I remembered what I had seen in
Washington, you know, the devastation that can really come.”206
Bryant, her family, and Hawkins made it to Hawkin’s mother’s house, and from there
Ruth Bryant was taken home by a BULK secretary. It was there that she was told by her
son that Cortez was outside, she let him in and was told that “‘I have a sawed-off shotgun
in the closet up there at Stouffer’s and if they start, you know, tracing anything to me
they’re going to find that gun and I’m going to be in trouble.’”207 Ruth Bryant and her
husband allowed Cortez to stay there for three days and also went up to his hotel room at
Stouffer’s and got the shotgun, with Bryant sneaking it out of the hotel under her dress. 208
The following day, with over a thousand National Guard troops and large
numbers of police patrolling the West End, violence broke out again. Describing the
violence as “worse than it was (Monday) night,” Guardsmen and police fought hit and
run tactics and scattered “action” in a wide area through the heart of the West End. City
hall imposed a curfew at 8 PM. Police arrested four men suspected of sniping at police
early Wednesday morning. Police blocked off Fourth Street from Broadway to the Ohio
River, a run of several city blocks, where window breaking and looting had occurred
Monday night. Louisville Police Chief C.J. Hyde claimed that “violators of any laws”
would be arrested and police would not “disregard violations of any kind…By this
method and a show of force at an early stage, we have been able to control the situation
to the extent that there is no large gathering of any kind.”209
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Despite Chief Hyde’s claims of control and order, by Wednesday morning at least
seventeen people had been injured during the previous days’ unrest. Four injured persons
at General Hospital were treated for gunshot wounds. All four were residents of the West
End and at least two of the four had been shot by the police. Mrs. Minnie Chenault, one
of those being treated had, according to witnesses, been shot by police “while standing at
the window of her apartment, by a policeman outside chasing a group of youths.”210
By 11 PM Tuesday night over a hundred Louisville residents had been arrested,
mostly for “breach of peace,” which for many involved violation of the 8 PM curfew. 211
Of those arrested, seven were protesters who had been part of a group of around fifty
mostly white protesters picketing outside city hall for removal of the National Guard
from the West End and amnesty for those that had been arrested during the two days of
unrest. The protesters, led by a priest and minister, had been protesting since their attempt
to enter city hall had been blocked by police at about 3:20 that afternoon. At 8:05, five
minutes after the beginning of the curfew, seven of the protesters were arrested and
charged with breach of peace and parading without a permit. The success the group did
have was the arrival of a representative of Martin Perley, the executive director of the
City-County Human Relations Commission. Speaking on behalf of the mayor, Perley
heard their demands, while maintaining that Schmied could not meet with the group
because he “doesn’t feel anything can be accomplished in an atmosphere of violence.”
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Entering city hall with the group’s demands, Perley returned with Schmied’s answer, that
“as soon as the disorders have quieted down, he’ll be glad to talk to you and all other
groups…you can help by trying to calm things in the West End.”213 It was after the
protesters continued picketing following their discussion with Perley that they were

56

warned about violation of the curfew and arrested after it had passed.
Also Tuesday afternoon, A.D. King spoke in a press conference where he laid the
blame for the continued violence on Mayor Schmied, stating that the Mayor “flatly
refused to go into the West End to help bring disorder to an end.” He continued, stating
that “we are opposed to violence in any form. It can be brought to an end if he comes to
talk. This is not a time for a politician to be arrogant. We have pleaded and begged for
them to come here.”214
Anne Braden, one of the founding members of WECC and an official of the
Southern Conference Education Fund (SCEF), repudiated the Mayor’s message and in
part echoed A.D. King’s words in stating that “we can’t ask the black people to be nonviolent until white people start being non-violent.”215 She also claimed that “the National
Guard may keep the area quiet, but the people will get madder and madder, and then
you’re going to have a permanent police state to keep things quiet.”216
Blame for the violence and unrest was a contentious issue, with Louisville’s black
public and city hall each laying blame at the feet of the other. Beyond that, the riot in the
West End was rhetorically constructed by different publics in a variety of ways as well.
While one might not consider their coverage wholly unfair, a consideration of a story
from The Courier Journal illustrates the point. Titled “Official Tells of Escape From
Besieged Bank”, Kathleen Arnold continually utilizes allusions and word choice that
paints a very specific picture of the destruction of property that occurred at the Bank of
Louisville branch on 28th and Dumesnil Tuesday. She writes that, after an initial
confrontation with a small group of five youths, twenty or thirty youths began throwing
bricks and concrete blocks through the bank’s windows. “While the 12 employees
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huddled in the back room, the manager waited in front, a loaded gun hidden behind his
back, watching the youths break down the windows.”217 Shortly after the heroic image
cut by the manager’s lone stand against the vandals, the police arrived, and “like the U.S.
cavalry, they came just in time.”218 Kathleen Arnold adds another quote from the
manager, writing “thank gosh a squad of police with shotguns walked up to the bank and
stayed while I finished up. We got into the car and got the hell out of there,” concluding
with the manager’s assertion that “right now I’m washing my hands of the area.”219 The
romantic vision of the police as U.S. cavalry, the inclusion of only the single viewpoint of
the bank manager, and the identification of the youths with the entire area serve to
alienate readers from the West End and from the rioters. While space is given on the
same page to voices from the other side, the only ones whose words were included are
A.D. King and Anne Braden, both much more palatable civil rights leaders than others
who espoused more militant or angry Black Power rhetoric.
The first West End voices other than King and Braden were heard the next page
over, where Paul M. Branzburg interviewed youth who had been at the rally two nights
earlier. Though all three youth interviewed give slightly different accounts of the chain of
events leading up to the escalation of violence, they agree that a few children and
teenagers throwing bottles and the unnecessary police response contributed to the riot.
One accused the police that arrived first of getting out of their cruiser with pistols drawn,
a claim that Capt. John Hampton, who said that he was the first officer on the scene,
refuted by saying that he had yet to draw his weapon. Another youth claimed that the
police did not initially have their weapons drawn, but drew them after more bottles were
thrown. Another person interviewed stated that “the police were acting like the colored
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people were supposed to run when they came in with sirens and guns.”220
While some of those interviewed expressed pride at the crowd’s reaction to the
police, Officer Hampton put forward a different version of events, one that would come
to define the ensuing legal proceedings surrounding the Black Six and the attribution of
blame for the riot. “‘It had direction,” he said. Hampton said that by 7 PM 200 persons
had gathered and within 15 minutes the crowd had swelled to 400. From a car roof, the
leaders were making anti-police speeches, he said, and from the crowd came cries of
“Black Power!” Others interviewed viewed the cause of the riot differently:
“All these stores are white stores,” said another. “They take money out of
the community and put nothing back in.”
At a nearby street corner, another man tried to sum it up:
“I don’t condone this sort of thing, but what do you expect after 400 years
in America? Look at the neighborhood. The houses are older than you and
me both! You people live in them 50 years and then we move in. It’s not
right.”221
The National Guard withdrew from the West End during the afternoon of
Wednesday, May 29. The curfew that had been in effect since Tuesday was lifted as well.
In conversation with “Negro militants”, Schmied agreed to the withdrawal, replacing the
National Guard troops with a combination of city police and African American marshals.
Police Chief C.J. Hyde, though he did report that looting had occurred at a higher rate
after the removal of the National Guard, stated late Wednesday that the marshal and
police forces were doing well. National Guard returned twice Wednesday as crowds
gathered, but both times the crowds were dispersed without aid from any Guardsmen. 222
The aforementioned negotiations between the mayor and African American
leadership was conducted by telephone between Mayor Schmied and Eugene Robinson,
the newly appointed associate director of the Human Relations Commission. The
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interview had been conducted by phone because Schmied stated that he “could not leave
police headquarters.”223 Outside of Eugene Robinson, A.D. King and his KCLC
(Kentucky Christian Leadership Council) was involved in the negotiations. The final
meeting occurred in person outside of police headquarters, where the plan to withdraw
the National Guard troops was announced.
Joining the African American marshals were groups of staff and directors of
several area settlement houses, who pledged their own “‘cooling’ efforts” to that of the
marshals. Mrs. Dorothy Naveau, who headed the Market Street Neighborhood House,
and others expressed their doubts at the effectiveness of the endeavor. One priest was
quoted as commenting that “‘If you haven’t been in the neighborhood before this trouble,
then you’re almost antagonizing (the Negro community) by coming in now…it’s sort of
an insincere move.’”224 Others, particularly Louisville whites, questioned the ability of
African American leadership to control African American youth. However, in citing A.D.
King, Eugene Robinson, Charles Tachau, and others, white residents demonstrated their
own lack of understanding of both the diverse nature of civil rights leadership in the West
End and in the figures that had risen to prominent positions in those civil rights publics
over the last few years.225 Louisville’s city government, in choosing to work expressly
with those individuals as representative of all African American leadership and in turn all
of the city’s African Americans, they demonstrated their recalcitrance to deal with
individuals who espoused Black Power ideology.
“The inability of local Negro leadership to contain the rioting in Louisville’s
west-end rest [sic] upon the shoulders of mayor Kenneth Schmied,” wrote Frank L.
Stanley, Jr. in The Louisville Defender on May 30.226 According to Frank L. Stanley, Jr.,
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the mayor had been golfing Tuesday while “the west-end was embattled and in
flames.”227 After being told by civil rights leaders that they had been unable to meet with
the mayor because he was golfing, rioters had refused further negotiatio n with civil rights
leaders. Stanley, Jr. also asserted that it was over-policing by the national Guard and
police in the West End that had led to resumed unrest the previous day after police had
arrested a man for “not moving along fast enough.”228 Interviews with others whom the
paper termed “black militants” predicted riots of the coming Memorial Day weekend,
with one individual interviewed stating that “We’re going to teach whitey a lesson this
week-end.”229 Other sources interviewed in the West End, particularly around 28th and
Greenwood, while their rhetoric was more ambivalent, expressed their support for the
rioters.230 Robert Sims told protesters that “‘I won’t tell you to stop rioting. I tell you to
do whatever is necessary.’”231
Meanwhile, the group of protesters that had been turned away from city hall the
previous day after seven of their members were arrested for violating curfew and charged
with breach of peace regrouped on Thursday. Calling themselves the White Emergency
Support Team (WEST), they stated their goal was to “investigate the causes of the riot
and to provide whatever assistance they could to black victims.”232 They were joined in
these endeavors by WECC, BULK, SCEF and others. Forty nine people who had been
arrested for violations of curfew were also released with their charges filed away and,
after being told of the agreement struck to remove the National Guard from the West
End, were told by Judge William G. Colson to work to stop the disturbances and
unrest.233
By the end of the week, the West End had seen a quarter of a million dollars in
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property damage, most in the first two day of violence. One hundred and nineteen fires
had been set, including burning cars and stores. Of the four hundred and seventy two
people that had been arrested, most had been for curfew violations. Officially, fifty two
people had been injured and two had been killed. 234 Drawing a distinction between ‘riot’
and insurrection’, insurance spokesman assured The Courier Journal readers that
property damage was covered under insurance policies. Unless the riot had been made an
insurrection by the governor or president. The insurance counsel defined insurrection as
“the open resistance against civil or established authority.”235
Manfred Reid agreed with the distinction made by the insurance counsel that the
riots had not in any constituted an insurrection against authority. Though he supported
such an insurrection, he stated that “it quieted down, it ran its course. What that really
was, was a protest more than a fight. They called it riots when it was really just protests,
it was a form of protests which extended into disorder.”236 Such methods, according to
Reid, would never work because “the conflicts that people have in terms of nations or in
groups within nations, it usually comes down to open conflict so that they can have a
stake at the table. Otherwise, you’re pleading.”237
Cautioning that he was not sure that the disturbances were over because none of
the underlying issues or tensions had been addressed, Rev. Leo Lesser, KCLC chairman,
gave credit for the calm achieved by the week’s end to Fannie Groves, whose son had
been one of the two killed in the violence. 238 Her son, James Claude Groves, had been
shot by policemen who had claimed the fourteen year old youth had been in the act of
looting. According to police, James Groves had been running with stolen items from a
grocery store when the police killed him by firing into a dark alley after him. 239 However,
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eye witnesses reported that James had been walking down the street when other youth ran
past him from the direction of the grocery store, and medical records showed that the
fourteen year old had been shot in his stomach and chest, contradicting the recollections
of the police officers.240 After visiting James Groves’ parents on Thursday, May 30,
Chief Hyde promised that he would assign to police man to investigate the incident and
James’ father told a press conference that “‘I want to see justice done to the man who
shot my boy.’”241
Matthias Browder, who had been nineteen years old, was the other person killed
in the riots. He had been shot and killed by W.J. Berger, the owner of Vermont Liquors.
Police reports showed that Berger had fired into a group of youths after the window to his
store was broken. Matthias Browder’s father claimed that his son was “murdered by
reckless gunfire” and no police investigators had come to make any inquiries into the
matter at all.242 Though Berger was initially charged with manslaughter, the case was
dismissed by Judge Colson, who claimed that Berger had been justified in the defense of
his store despite the lack of evidence that Browder was involved in any vandalism or
looting.243
The responses of civil rights leaders to the violence and the attempts to control it
varied throughout the week. Lyman Johnson recalled the rioting youth urging him off the
street as he tried to calm them down, saying that police would not discriminate in
arresting him along with everyone else. “And sure enough,” Johnson stated:
“when the statistics were counted up after the affair, so many were
rounded up and put in jail, and some were accused of conspiracy and all
that kind of stuff. The police were beating up any number of people. Their
heads were bloody, and I think as many as two people were killed, and it
was a needless, needless waste…”244
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While A.D. King, the KCLC, and others were urging West End rioters to “cool it”, Rev.
C. Eubank Tucker was protesting the appointment of Eugene Robinson to the position of
Associate Director of the city-county Human Relations Committee. Voicing his
unhappiness with the appointment to Dr. Perley, Rev. Tucker claimed that WECC was
filled with Communist sympathizers, including Eugene Robinson. He also stated that
Robinson should not have been considered for the appointment after his role in the
housing demonstration of the previous year, especially in plans to disrupt the Kentucky
Derby.245 Robinson responded to Rev. Tucker’s calls for his resignation “with an appeal
for the bisop to join him in building a strong community.”246 WECC, WEST, and other
civil rights organizations also turned to protesting the dismissal of the manslaughter
charges against Berger. When taken before Mayor Schmied, the Mayor claimed that he
had no jurisdiction in such matters. 247 Amid this disjointed mixture of responses, which
even included a short WAVE-TV broadcast on Monday night by A.D. King, James
Cortez, and Neville Tucker urging West End residents to stay in their homes and off the
streets, the dissonance between the black public sphere and city hall grew wider.
This gulf was increased by mayor Schmied’s continued reluctance to visit the
West End. Despite a unanimous vote that he visit the area of the disturbances by the end
of the week, Mayor Schmied stated instead he would only visit the West End after all
“peace and tranquility” had been restored. Schmied added that “meetings with
neighborhood groups do not often accomplish much. ‘It’s a self-satisfaction sort of thing
with the neighbors to meet with the mayor’…”248 This led Rev. Miller, chairman of the
Louisville and Jefferson County Crime Commission committee on riots and disorders, to
state that the greatest ongoing harm in “this crisis” was the mayor’s refusal to visit the
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people in the West End. While Miller claimed some individuals would make visible
displays of their anger, including cursing and shouting insults, Miller insisted that West
End residents just wanted a chance to talk to the mayor and air their grievances. 249 This
reluctance on the part of the mayor, and his lack of visibility during the entire week’s
disturbances, led Sam Hawkins to accuse “the mayor of being ‘afraid of black people’. 250
Robinson argued against others who preferred that Mayor Schmied meet with small
groups of African American leaders by claiming that the African American community in
the West End had no leaders and that those days were gone. Instead, they were
individuals and “‘the day is gone when you get X number of people together and say that
each of them represents X number of people.”251 Despite this assertion, working with a
small number of perceived moderate African American leaders like A.D. King was how
city hall had operated throughout the week. Louisville’s black public, along with WECC
and BULK’s efforts to foster African American identity and pride, now desired to deny
the ability of the city government to determine the mouthpieces of the community for
them.
Turning a blind eye to charges of police brutality and over-policing by the city
police and National Guard and dismissing the manslaughter charges against Berger were
only the initial waves of Louisville’s government backlash against the violence. The next
step was the assessment of blame and the search for the “organizers” of the violence. On
May 31, the city ordered an investigation into many African American organizations and
civil rights publics that were believed to be involved. 252 Throughout the week,
accusations had arisen that the riots were planned, though no evidence had surfaced to
substantiate them.253 Everyone from Carl and Anne Braden, federal anti-poverty workers,
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and others were suspected and set to be investigated, a move which Eugene Robinson
denounced, specifically contacting The Courier Journal to disassociate himself from any
idea of collaboration or cooperation on the recommended investigations, calling the
accusations an attempt by white Louisville to cleanse its conscience. 254 The Bradens
issued a statement saying that “Whenever they want a scapegoat in Louisville, they pick
out the Bradens. We have been scapegoats here now since 1954…we had hoped that after
14 years, Louisville would now have reached the point of facing its problems instead of
finding scapegoats…or at least find a new scapegoat.”255 With Cortez and the others that
would become the Black Six, Louisville’s government did just that.
“Well, they wanted Cortez because he was an outside agitator,” Ruth Bryant
recalled.256 In fact, one of the points made by the crime commission had been to
determine exactly who Cortez was and who he worked for. 257 The Courier Journal, in
seeking to confirm whether or not James Cortez was the Carmicahel aide that he claimed
to be, reported that “Leigh [Stokely Carmichael’s aide] added, and SNCC headquarters in
Washington confirmed, that Cortez is not an aide of Carmichael’s. SNCC headquarters in
Washington said Cortez had no connection with the organization.”258 Among West End
organizations, the rumor began to spread that Cortez was an FBI informer.
During the three days when Cortez was staying at the Bryants’, Ruth Bryant
recalled that:
“My husband said he would get up at night and Cortez would be talking
long-distance to someone on the telephone and he would always hang up
when my husband came in the room. More and more information kept
coming to us that Cortez was an FBI informant. Anne Braden and them
didn’t feel that he was.”259
The Louisville Defender began to ask similar questions of Cortez, his origins, and his
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intentions. In the article “Black League Paid Expenses for Cortez”, they write that
“unconfirmed reports link Cortez with Newark, N.J., New York City, and Baltimore, Md.
Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee members refuse to claim
him.”260 Continuing in the article, the Defender sought to distance Cortez from BULK
and, by extension, Louisville’s black public. They write:
“The original purpose for summoning Cortez to this city was harmless. He
was an accomplished orator who claimed knowledge of every civil rights
activists of note. All BULK wanted Cortez to do in Louisville was talk to
the people, arouse in them a black awareness and marshall [sic] support
for BULK’s aim to have Michael Clifford discharged from the police
force.
The plan did not go according to script. By design or error, the spark was
ignited, the riot started.”261
In distancing themselves from Cortez, The Louisville Defender not only worked to
distance BULK and other suspected local activists from the violence and the conspiracy
charges that were being brought against individuals, but sought to distance themselves
and all of Louisville’s black public for the blame for the violence. It is important here to
not dismiss the possibility of the possible intentionality of Cortez’s actions. In 1968 in
other cities around the country, FBI agent provocateurs had been used to espouse militant
rhetoric once ingratiated into local Black Power movements. That rhetoric was then used
as evidence against the local activists after their arrest. 262
Cortez was arrested on June 1, 1968, at his room in the Stouffer Hotel. Asked to
accompany two detectives to meet Chief Hyde, Cortez accompanied voluntarily, but
stopped in the lobby to place a call to an unknown place in Virginia where he received no
answer.263 The prosecution in Cortez’s 1970 appeals trial also stated that, while at the
police station, Cortez told them that he was an FBI informant and that the Louisville
police had interfered in his mission. His mission in Louisville, he claimed, was to stop
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Robert Sims and Sam Hawkins, who planned:
“To get axes and dig trenches around the oil refineries in the west end.
Cortez said he was supposed to purchase the dynamite…and that Simms
[sic] and Hawkins and others had planned to blow up the oil refineries in
the west end of Louisville. He inferred that he was supposed to frustrate
the planned dynamiting.”264
When Cortez took the stand in his defense, he denied that he had left the Hotel with the
officers voluntarily and that he had never claimed to be an FBI informant. However, he
also claimed that he had not told the police that he had a sawed off shotgun in his hotel
room and that the first time he had ever seen the weapon was when it had been brought in
as evidence in the initial trial.265 Portions of this story may or may not have been
supported by the autobiography of FBI agent William C. Sullivan, who writes about an
FBI informant whose actions and circumstances matched up exactly with those of Cortez,
though Sullivan named him Peter Cardoza in the autobiography. If Peter Cardoza was in
fact James Cortez, then Sullivan rights that Cortez came to Louisville and transported the
shotgun without FBI permission and that the FBI subsequently withdrew support from
him.266
Whether or not the presence of the shotgun, which according to police was broken
down into three pieces in an attaché case and left in the hotel room right where Cortez
told them it would be, contradicts Ruth Bryant’s assertion that she smuggled the shotgun
out of the hotel room on Monday night remains unclear. Broken down and hidden, it is
entirely possible that the shotgun was returned to the hotel room by Cortez, though it is
less likely that, as Cortez claimed, the shotgun was a police plant.
Sam Hawkins and Robert Sims were also arrested on a variety of charges,
including conspiracy to destroy public property in regards to their alleged involvement in

68

the plot to blow up the oil refinery. Ruth Bryant, through WECC and other organizations,
continued to work to raise bond money for them. However, Judge Colson ruled that no
one “past eighteenth street could put up the bond for them,” which in effect meant that no
individuals, groups, or organizations in the West End could post the extravagant bond for
the release of Sims or Hawkins. Later in the summer, Ruth Bryant was called by Neville
Tucker and told that she too had been indicted on conspiracy charges. 267 Manfred Reid
was also brought up on the same charges, as well as the earlier charges of assault and
battery of a police officer, for which he was found guilty but the charges were
probated.268 Walter “Pete” Cosby became the last member of the Black Six, based on the
allegation that, along with Cortez, he had been riding around in a car planning places to
dynamite.269

The riots in Louisville’s West End in May 1968 were not the result of Black
Power, nor of “‘a known outside agitator, looter, and rioter,” as Mayor Schmied
asserted.270 Louisville’s black public, almost completely without cooperation from city
hall, worked to control violence in the West End. Division among those civil rights
leaders over whether or not to support the rioters arose not from the existence or
adherence to Black Power rhetoric, but from the community’s anger, frustration, and
continued lack of success in pushing for real change for the West End. Throughout 1967
and 1968, Louisville’s civil rights publics utilized a variety of methods to fight for their
goals. The militant stances of some of their prominent members such as those in BULK
or elsewhere did not act to cause the riots. The refusal of Mayor Schmied and city hall to
work with more than a few, hand-picked and moderate civil rights leaders, the presence
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of the National Guard in the West End, the over-policing and violence exercised by
police, and other factors worked to instigate and shape the riots. By their end, peace had
been restored but, as many residents of the West End had asserted, none of the problems
that caused them had been addressed. And, as 1968 wore on, the Black Six were brought
up on charges of conspiracy to destroy public property, along with a host of other
charges.
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Conclusion: The Black Six
“We shall have to struggle for the right to define ourselves and our relationship to the
society, and to have these terms recognized. This is the first necessity of a free people,
and the first right that any oppressor must suspend.” 271 – Kwame Ture and Charles V.
Hamilton, Black Power: The Politics of Liberation

Robert Sims and Sam Hawkins had worked with police as two of the appointed
African American marshals patrolling the West End as part of the ‘cool it’ campaign. 272
They were arrested Saturday June 1 after the early morning arrest of James Cortez the
same day. Police claimed that the three had planned to use dynamite to blow up oil
refineries in the West End. The refineries were protected through the night by National
Guard troops. The charges were based on police claims that Cortez had told them about
the dynamite plot after being brought to the police station early that morning. They also
produced witnesses that claimed Cortez had told them about the plot as well the previous
day.273
Discussion became heated during the court of inquiry called by Judge Colson.
With cross-examination prohibited and no time to gather witnesses for the defense, the
defense attorneys for Sims, Hawkins, and Cortez argued that Judge Colson had no
authority to call the court of inquiry in the first place. Repeatedly overruling motions to
postpose the hearing, Judge Colson also exchanged angry words with Neville Tucker,
who was serving as one of the defense attorneys. During recess, Judge Colson consulted
with Mayor Schmied and other city hall administrators. 274 While in the West End all
vacations and off days remained cancel for policemen patrolling 12 hour shifts, bond for
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Sims and Hawkins was set at $50,000 each. Bond for Cortez was set at $75,000.
Demonstrators, both African American and white, gathered outside to protest “a ‘frameup’ of black leaders.”275 Judge Colson concluded the court of inquiry by ordering Chief
Hyde “to obtain security warrants” based on the prosecution’s evidence as presented
before the court. “As the defendants were led out of the courtroom, Cortez shouted, “This
is justice…good old America.”276
The “Black Six”, Cortez, Sims, Hawkins, Reid, Cosby, and Bryant, were formally
indicted on conspiracy charges in October. Manfred Reid had previously been held on a
$25,000 bond on a bad check charge, though that was dimissed on September 6 due to a
lack of evidence. His indictment for assaulting officer Clifford remained, though the
police department had previously stated that Reid was assaulted by Officer Clifford
without provocation. Charges against Officer Noe, who had shot and killed 14 year old
James Groves, and William Berger, who had shot and killed 19 year old Matthias
Browder, were dismissed by Judge Colson. By the time of the October indictment, the
charge of conspiring to blow up the oil refineries in the West End had become a more
general charge of conspiracy to destroy private property. Following all of this were
continued allegations that the entire case against the Black Six was merely a cover up of
the real cause of the disorders, “poverty; neglected schools, police brutality, poor
housing, etc.”277

If so, was “it possible, people are asking, that the real conspirators

in this community are not those under indictment but some of the public officials in our
City Hall and Courthouse?”278
Ruth Bryant, in reflecting on her efforts on behalf of WECC and other civil rights
organizations, said that:
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“I had cost the city, in terms of things that they had to do in complying
with guidelines…millions of dollars. And then it looked like millions of
dollars were going to be lost again, you see [for the loss of the model city
grant that Ruth Bryant spearheaded]. So people say, ‘Well why was Ruth
Bryant involved in the Black Six? How did she get in the Black Six?’
Well, that was one reason.”279
Bill Allison spoke similarly when asked later to speak on the Black Six. He said that:
“The thing that was so stark about the Black Six case was that they
arrested black leaders from all different segments of black society, so that
they were sending a message to the entire black community…They really
targeted, it seemed like they targeted the entire black community strata to
send a message to – a chilling effect.”280
These charges continued throughout the trial. The conception of the trial as government
repression of African American and civil rights publics that Mayor Schmied’s
administration found undesirable certainly had precedent in other cities around the
country. Even the charges of conspiracy and allegations of outside agitators echoed
similar events in Greensboro, North Carolina happening almost simultaneously. 281 In
both cases, the city had responded with excessive force and military tactics to first subdue
the area, and then worked to repress the most outspoken of its activists with charges of
conspiracy and inciting a riot.
All this distracted from the actual causes of the riot that city hall refused to
acknowledge. Whether or not the riots were planned, and, if they were premeditated in
any form, it was more than likely not by the Black Six, is in fact nearly immaterial. No
rioters, looters, or militants in the West End created the conditions under which a riot was
possible, nor exacerbated those conditions through continued judicial and police
oppression. Black Power may have given the oppressed of the West End a greater
awareness of themselves and their conditions, and, through the black press, outspoken
activists, and community organizations such as WECC and BULK, given them a voice.
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Black Power did not incite them to violence.
The trial and the proceedings surrounding it drug on for the better part of two
years. At first, legal proceedings were held in Louisville, but a change of venue was
granted by Criminal Court Judge Herman Jorris and the trial was moved to Munfordville
in Hart County, Kentucky. The judge there, who according to Manfred Reid, “sent it back
to Louisville, because he felt that they didn’t have jurisdiction and that wasn’t an issue
facing Hart County. While Judge Jorris claimed that publicity in Louisville had made it
impossible to conduct an impartial trail in Louisville, Cortez claimed that the judge
wanted “‘to put us in a racist county. You’re not going to gage [sic] me. You want those
damn white farmers to judge us with no Negroes on the jury.’ Cortez was shoved from
the courtroom after” his outburst.”282
Ruth Bryant recalled that in Hart County:
“The farmers were all lined up down the road with overalls and straw hats
and corncob pipes, spittoons in the courtroom, this sort of thing. It was a
three ring circus. And some of the guys said, like Pete Cosby, “They want
a circus. I’m going to give them a circus,” and he’d ride his big Cadillac
up there…It was an ordeal, it was a great ordeal.”283
After being moved back to Louisville in January of the following year, the trial officially
began on June 22, 1970, over two years after the riots had occurred. 284 Lyman Johnson
served as a witness against Cortez, where he recounted the harsh words that the two had
exchanged during the meeting at Zion Baptist Church the Sunday before the riot. Lyman
Johnson, when asked his take on the riot, said that while it was a shame that race relations
had gotten to the point where an outside agitator could push the tensions that way that
Johnson thought Cortez had done, it was the city’s power structure that bore
responsibility for the riot. After his comments and dismissal from the witness stand,
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Cortez leapt up and shook Johnson’s hand. 285
After the conclusion of the prosecution’s case on July 7, 1970, the Judge ordered
a directed verdict of not guilty, citing a lack of evidence by the prosecution as his
reasoning.286 The trial of the Black Six was over and, while the victory was celebrated,
the Black Six, WECC, and Louisville’s other civil rights groups continued to criticize the
existence of the trial and the city’s flimsy charges in the first place.287 Ruth Bryant stated
that “they used Cortez as a scapegoat to discourage, to crush the movement. They used
me to help crush the movement.”288
Manfred Reid stated that:
“The cost to my life [of the trial] was the loss of my broker’s license, the
loss of my marriage, loss of my business, and loss of my character and
reputation. It reduces you to being homeless and being destitute. That’s
what it reduces you to. You have to overcome that by just pure
determination.”289
That attitude of pure determination characterized the Louisville civil rights movement
from 1967 through the end of the trial of the Black Six, but it also characterized it before
and after. It was the rhetoric, not the determination, which changed. Louisville’s black
public continued to prove that throughout the trial. Led by WECC, a coalition of the
city’s civil rights organizations was instrumental in posting bond for all of the Black Six
except Cortez. They demonstrated, held rallies, and continued to pressure the city
officials on behalf of those charged. According to Manfred Reid, Stokely Carmichael was
invited to town in the summer of 1968 to support protests against police brutality.
290 Throughout

the process they remained active and committed. The Louisville Defender

continued in its role as the local extension of a robust and pro-active black press.291
Though the trial of the Black Six may well have been an attempt at repression of the
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African American community through defamation of some of its leading activists and
members, the effort failed.
In the following years, struggles for civil rights continued in Louisville, as
housing, school desegregation, and poverty continued to be major issues. Individuals,
organizations, and the black public continued to work to further these and other causes.
Conspiracy cases as a means of government repression continued, with several notable
cases across the country.292
However, the conspiracy trial was only one of the means by which Louisville’s
government sought to impose their will on the African American community. Urban
Renewal and the unchecked practices of racist real estate agents in the 1960’s had further
segregated the city, leading to a higher and higher concentration of African Americans in
the West End. Protests, petitions, and other non-violent efforts to rectify this had been
ignored. Peaceful demonstrations in 1967 had been met with violent and at times brutal
repression. Continual failure to address the conditions in the West End, rude and
disrespectful treatment, and a further widely publicized case of police brutality, that of
Officer Clifford beating Manfred Reid without provocation, led to a heightening of
tensions in the West End. Further police intervention, over-policing, and brutal strategies
instigated and escalated the riots. During the riots, city hall refused to meet with any but
select civil rights representatives, and even then the meetings were delayed and handled
in a paternalistic manner. Blaming ‘outside agitators’ and others for the unrest, Mayor
Schmied continually refused to visit the West End and listen to the grievances of the
residents there.
If the prevailing narrative of Black Power in America is one of defeat, as Peniel
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Joseph asserts, then it is a defeat caused by brutal oppression by city governments. City
administrations like Louisville’s continued to stall, subvert, and attempt to remove civil
rights victories. Frank L. Stanley, Sr., speaking to college students in Bowling Green in
1969, said that “even in states like Kentucky, where segregation is outlawed in most of its
forms, Negroes still live largely behind the barriers of extra-legal segregation.”293 Such
segregation continued in Louisville after events of 1967-1970. Seemingly, civil rights
initiatives had been largely defeated by a city government threatened by Black Power
activists who “posed a radical threat to the status quo.”294 . However, viewing Black
Power, in Louisville and elsewhere, from this perspective overlooks what Black Power
was.
Black Power did involve “striking at the very base of white control – the power to
define what is real and unreal, permissible and impermissible.”295 However, they
achieved this through their creation of a black public, shaped it by fostering the shaping
of an African American identity, and working to foster racial pride. Black Power activists
worked to shape robust institutions, organizations, and communities that could challenge
racist and segregationist practices in city governments, paternalism in accepted methods
of civil rights progress, and work actively to shape identities, communities, and lives of
success and equality. As evidenced by activists like Hawkins and Sims, there was
militancy in the movement, and the use of violent rhetoric. According to Frank L.
Stanley, Sr. “the social revolution has done much toward establishing for the Negro an
affirmative identity in American life.”296 Black Power was a rejection of paternalism in
civil rights, for otherwise “it’s the same slave you had a hundred years ago, because
you’re pleading to your master for help. I don’t believe in that.”297 Black Power, in
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Louisville during the housing demonstrations of 1967-1970, involved civil rights and
community publics adopting new methodologies and rhetorical tools to fight for civil
rights. Black Power represented “their drive to achieve dignity, to achieve their share of
power, indeed, to become their own men and women – in this time and in this land.”298
Black Power was the struggle of Louisville’s African American communities, activists,
and organizations to become a black public capable of creating and defining itself.
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